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Introduction
 American news anchor Ted Koppel perhaps best summed up the appeal of Lyndon 
Johnson, the 36th President of the United States, when he said, “We like, as Americans, 
that sort of western image of the big, swaggering, broad-shouldered American coming 
into the town that is in trouble and clearing everything up."  Johnson is perhaps the first 
American political figure to fully embody cowboy, western, and frontier mythology.  
 Johnson represents an important shift in politics towards a strategy involving the 
conscious manipulation of imagery to achieve both local, statewide, and national 
electoral appeal.  Most historians argue that Johnson’s conscious and overt manipulation 
of cowboy and western mythology began after his election to the Senate in November of 
1948.  In actuality, Johnson began to manipulate frontier myth as early as in his election 
to the House of Representatives in 1937.  
 Johnson, as candidate for Congress, Congressman, and candidate for Senate 
consciously participated in the development of a politically advantageous western and 
cowboy identity.  The elements of Johnson’s voting record and persona he chose to 
emphasize in campaigns reflected both his internal struggle to define a political identity, 
and his efforts to move with the rapid shifts in political ideology occurring in Texas and 
the nation as a whole.  Through the use of image, Johnson cultivated a political 
philosophy—a philosophy that combined elements of populism, the New Deal, and myth
—in which he truly believed.
6
 Essential to a full analysis of those forces that shaped Johnson’s personal life and 
molded his political identity are several critical political biographies of Johnson.  Johnson 
was an incredibly complex man.  Perhaps this explains why there are so many different 
interpretations of his life.   Many biographers of Johnson in a post-Vietnam era were 
exceedingly harsh.  The Vietnam War served as catalyst for negative portrayals of 
Johnson.  These portrayals are the consequence of what the war did to the nation, and 
because of this war, a generation of Americans can only see Johnson through the lens of 
Vietnam.  However, more recently Johnson has enjoyed something of a rehabilitation in 
the minds of Americans and biographers alike because of a greater focus  on the positive 
aspects of his presidency, most notably his Great Society programs.  
 Much of my analysis stems from these biographies: Robert Caro’s The Years of 
Lyndon Johnson series, Path to Power1 and Means of Ascent2, Robert Dallek’s Lone Star 
Rising,3 Ronnie Dugger’s The Politician: The Drive for Power, from the Frontier to 
Master of the Senate,4 and Paul Conkin’s Big Daddy From the Pedernales.5  Caro’s 
biographies present an image of Johnson as a conniving, manipulative man desperate for 
power.  Dallek’s biography of Johnson is also decidedly negative.  Dugger and Conkin 
present kinder interpretations of Johnson’s drive, while still demonstrating that Johnson 
was conscious of his manipulation of western mythology to achieve political goals.  My 
7
1 Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power,  (New York: Knopf: 1982).
2 Robert A. Caro,  The Years of Lyndon Johnson: Means of Ascent, (New York: Knopf: 1990).
3 Robert Dallek,  Lone Star Rising, (New York: Oxford University Press: 1991).
4 Ronnie Dugger, The Politician: The Drive for Power, from the Frontier to Master of the Senate, (New 
York: WW Norton & Company: 1982).  
5 Paul C. Conkin, Big Daddy From the Pedernales, (Boston: Twayne Publishers: 1986).
work differs from the existing biographical literature of Johnson because it places much 
greater emphasis on Johnson’s early recognition of the significance of frontier mythology  
to his identity.  
 Three works, Jane Tompkins’ West of Everything,6 Richard Slotkin’s Gunfighter 
Nation,7 and Henry Nash Smith’s Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth8 
established the context of the cowboy, western, and frontier mythology that shaped 
Johnson’s political strategies.  West of Everything deals specifically with the 
dissemination of the myth through literature and film.  My work uses Gunfighter Nation 
as a jumping off point into the world of myth.  I use Slotkin’s definition of myth to 
explain precisely what we mean when we speak of myths, which here are stories and 
symbols “drawn from a society’s history that have acquired through persistent usage the 
power of symbolizing that society’s ideology and of dramatizing its moral consciousness 
with all the complexities and contradictions that consciousness may contain.”9  
Additionally, Slotkin’s work provides my basis for an understanding of the violent, 
individualistic, masculinized strain of the frontier myth.  Virgin Land provides the basis 
for what I argue is Lyndon Johnson’s initial interpretation of the frontier myth: a 
feminized strain of the myth that is community-oriented and has a civilization-building 
and agrarian focus.  
8
6 Jane Tompkins, West of Everything: The Inner Life of Westerns, (Cary, NC: Oxford University Press: 
1993). 
7 Richard Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century America, (Norman, 
OK: University of Oklahoma Press: 1998).
8 Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press: 1978).
9 Slotkin, Gunfighter Nation, 5.  
 Also vitally important in establishing the proper context and environment in 
which Lyndon Johnson’s political development took place were George Norris Green’s 
The Establishment in Texas Politics,10 and Jordan A. Schwarz’s The New Dealers.11  
Green’s work takes the reader through a history of Texas politics and chronicles the 
divides that emerged in Texas just as Johnson emerged as a political force.  Green’s work 
is essential to my understanding of the political conditions and deep divide in the 
Democratic Party of Texas that allowed for the success of hillbilly Pappy O’Daniel and 
over conservatives.  Schwarz’s work provides context for the New Deal, its explosion in 
Texas, and Johnson’s work with it.  It helps illuminate important behind-the-scenes 
political maneuverings in Texas that led to Texas’ place not quite in full support of the 
New Deal, but not quite against it either.  
 Johnson was a master of image and cultivated it most frequently through 
speeches, sometimes delivered in person, and in later years after he mastered technology, 
via the radio.  This work makes frequent use of text from Johnson’s speeches.  Contained 
clearly in the speeches are the ideas Johnson valued and wished to express.  
Fundamentally, these excerpts from Johnson’s speeches represent the type of image he 
strove to cultivate.
 This work begins with a narrative account of Johnson’s ancestors and life until 
1937.  It starts with the birth of a boy into a very specific place, the Hill Country.  The 
land on which Johnson was raised played a large role in the politician he became, so 
9
10 George Norris Green, The Establishment in Texas Politics: The Primitive Years, 1938-57, (Norman, OK: 
The University of Oklahoma Press: 1984).
11 Jordan A. Schwarz, The New Dealers: Power Politics in the Age of Roosevelt, (New York: Vintage: 
1994).
careful analysis of that land and the dream-destroying affect it has on people that live on 
it are also present. The difficulty of life on the land of the Hill Country, and how that 
difficulty led to  Populism, an important political movement in Texas and a movement of 
vital importance in shaping Johnson’s political ideas because of its emphasis on the 
feminized frontier myth’s value of community, is discussed.  
 Following this context-setting, I move chronologically through time into an 
analysis of Johnson as politician from 1937 until 1941.  I pay great attention to Johnson’s 
win in the 1937 Congressional Election and analyze the reasons why it was politically 
advantageous for Johnson to cultivate a political identity based solely on support of 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal Platform.  Johnson relied heavily on Roosevelt’s 
platform because of the program’s enormous popularity with farmers in Texas.  This was 
important to Johnson because of his personal background with farming and Populism, 
which placed heavy value on the farmer.
 Next, I take a brief journey into the world of myth.   I establish what it means 
when we say “frontier,” “cowboy,” and “western.”  I examine two popular strains of 
frontier mythology, the violent, masculinized strain, and the community-oriented, 
agrarian, feminized strain that Johnson embodied in his early political career.  I explain 
common signifiers of the west, including a particular posture and wardrobe, and examine 
how these signifiers and myths have been disseminated through a culture as to be 
powerful enough to have political significance.  Here, special attention is paid to the 
origin of the cowboy dime novel and the popularity of John Wayne Westerns.  
10
 Following an explanation of myth, I examine Johnson’s failed senatorial bid of 
1941. Working within my established context of myth, I explain that Johnson lost the 
election because he failed to capitalize upon a populist appeal.  I explain the important 
political lesson Johnson learned from his opponent Pappy O’Daniel’s successful 
employment of myth and signifiers of the west—that populism and becoming one of the 
people is more important than telling the people what you will do for them.
 Then, I move to the years 1941-1948 and examine how, even while at war, 
Johnson cultivated a political image that was in line with his interpretation of the frontier 
myth.  Johnson evoked strains of both the masculinized and feminized versions of the 
frontier myth in his wartime positions.  I use speeches to chronicle Johnson’s frequent use 
of frontier mythology in his successful bid for reelection.
 Finally, I examine Johnson’s successful and complete employment of a frontier 
image in one of the most significant elections in Texas history—Johnson’s bid for Senate 
against Coke Stevenson.  Here, through his speeches and radio addresses, I present an 
image of Lyndon Johnson finally completely comfortable and self-assured in his role as 
western politician.  I demonstrate his use of myth to great advantage.  Then, I move to a 
brief analysis of Johnson’s shift from using feminized version of the myth while 
campaigning to using the masculinized version of the myth while in higher office.  I 
argue that this shift is responsible for the ultimate downfall of Johnson’s political career
—the Vietnam War.  
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Chapter One:
Pride, Poverty, and Populism:
Molding Forces of Lyndon Johnson’s Early Life
 To truly understand the transformation of Johnson’s image that allowed him to 
become the political force that was the Lyndon Johnson of the House of Representatives 
and Senate, one must first understand the land where he was raised, his ancestors, his 
upbringing, and his early life.  Since the end of his presidency,  many biographers have 
chronicled Johnson’s rise to to power.  There is, however, some disagreement on 
Johnson’s true motivations at almost every important juncture in his life.12  Though 
interpretations of these motivations may differ, and though we will never know straight 
from the horse’s mouth Johnson’s true motivations,  there is value in a close examination 
of the forces that played a significant role in shaping Lyndon Johnson.  Fundamentally, 
Johnson was shaped by the forces of a landscape that led people who lived there to a 
special breed of Texas populism.
 Fundamentally, Johnson’s early political journey and shift in image mirrors the 
story of the evolution of Texas and American politics at large.  Lyndon Johnson’s rise to 
power coincided with an America ready to accept populism on a large scale.  Johnson 
successfully brought the power of the frontier myth of cooperation to a larger audience.  
12
12 Perhaps the most respected biographer of Johnson is historian Robert A. Caro, who presents a decidedly 
negative imagining of Johnson in his series The Years of Lyndon Johnson: The Path to Power (New York: 
Knopf, 1982).  I rely extensively on Caro in this chapter, but would be remiss if I did not also mention 
historian Robert Dallek’s important biographical work Lone Star Rising (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991).  Dallek’s work strikes balance, presenting Johnson as a more complicated and morally 
ambiguous figure than the Johnson of Caro’s work.  Also important to this chapter is the work of founding 
editor of the Texas Observer, Ronnie Dugger,  The Politician: The Drive for Power, from the Frontier to 
Master of the Senate (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1982).  These biographies are important in that 
they present themes that shaped Johnson’s early life; these themes are the foundation upon which an 
analysis of Johnson’s later use of cowboy and western mythology rest.   Also of note: all three of these 
biographies (even Caro’s) are sold in the gift shop of the LBJ Library in Austin, Texas.
Texas populism is precisely what Johnson’s upbringing primed him to bring to a national 
stage.
 As important as an understanding of Johnson’s ancestors themselves is 
understanding the land that shaped them.  Most fundamentally, the Hill Country of Texas 
is “a trap—a trap baited with grass.”13  Before Lyndon’s ancestors arrived, the Hill 
Country lacked civilization.  As the white man brought civilization to this land—at once 
stunningly beautiful and impossibly difficult; hard on dreams, but long on mythology—
the land tamed the man, and Lyndon’s ancestors, the idealistic Buntons and Johnsons 
were particularly affected by this land.  Lyndon Johnson came of age on the land of the 
Texas Hill Country.  This land was difficult, and this land helped shape the way that 
people including Lyndon Johnson viewed politics.  Johnson’s brand of populism and his 
own beliefs about the frontier myth were borne of this land and what living on and 
farming this land for a living does to individuals.  
 The mythology of the Hill Country and its special place in Texas history are 
important to an understanding of later themes Johnson used in his campaigns for the 
House of Representatives and the Senate.   Johnson used these themes to evoke a feeling 
in the voting population of his district that they were in a place of mythic significance to 
America, Texas, and the frontier.  Texas occupies a unique position in American 
geography—at once, it is both southern and western.  The Hill Country is perhaps the 
first place in Texas to be considered a truly western space.  Thus, the Hill Country served 
as sort of birthplace for all western and frontier myth in Texas.  This place of hardship, 
13
13 Caro, Path to Power, 8.  
where cooperation and governmental assistance were crucial for success, was the 
birthplace of frontier myth in Texas and in the mind of Lyndon Johnson.  
Figure 1: Geographical Regions of Texas
The geographical regions of Texas, labeled by number.  The Texas Hill Country is 
represented by number three and encompasses the central portion of Texas and most 
notably, the city of Austin.14  
 The white men who first settled the Hill Country in the 1840s and 1850s were 
farmers who viewed it as a land of abundance.15  The settlers were largely southern 
mountaineers—rural immigrants desperate to make a living.16  The tall grass that grew in 
14
14 ICUT, “Regional Map of Texas,” Independent Colleges and Universities of Texas, http://www.icut.org/
RegionalMap.html, accessed March 4, 2012.
15 Terry G. Jordan, "Hill Country," Handbook of Texas Online, http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/
articles/ryh02,  accessed March 04, 2012. Published by the Texas State Historical Association.
16 Jordan, “Hill Country.”
the Hill Country was a sign to these men that their crops would certainly grow, food for 
their cattle would be abundant, and wealth would come to them.17  What these men did 
not know was that this tall grass had grown over centuries, and its growth had only been 
made possible through prairie fires.  The soil beneath the slow-growing grass was thin 
soil; the Hill Country was limestone country, a difficult place to grow crops because it 
produced fertile soil very slowly.  This problem was compounded by the fact that the 
Texas Hill Country is, as its name implies, rather hilly.  The thin layers of fertile soil that 
developed were particularly vulnerable to wind and rain.18  This made farming incredibly 
difficult and governmental assistance vital to the survival of those who made their 
livelihood farming.  
 In the Hill Country, there is a line of grave importance which early settlers did not 
understand.  Perhaps if they had they would have abandoned this land.  The line, called 
“isohyet,” is a line “drawn on a map so that all points along it have equal rainfall.”19  This 
line, coupled with the Hill Country’s unusually high rate of evaporation and uneven 
distribution of rainfall, meant disaster for farmers trying to produce crops:  “east of that 
line...farmers could prosper; west of it, they couldn’t.”20  It is crucial to emphasize that 
early settlers did not know they were crossing this line.  Moving westward, moving to 
this Hill Country, was a way to escape poverty and pursue fortunes beyond one’s wildest 
dreams.  These men did not and could not have possibly comprehended the ways in 
15
17 Caro, Path to Power, 11.  
18 Dugger, The Drive for Power, 26.  
19 Caro, Path to Power, 12.  
20 Ibid.  
which this land would break both them and their dreams.  From an early age, because of 
the difficulty of the land his family farmed, Lyndon Johnson was cognizant of the 
important role government played in the daily lives of individuals. 
 It is important to examine Lyndon Johnson’s ancestors particularly because Hill 
Country ranchers were “convinced of the importance of breeding.”21  Though breeding 
typically refers to animals, here we speak instead of certain traits that can be born in a 
person, traits that are passed down from generation to generation and are inescapable.  
Johnson later came to understand that his ancestors and their ties to the Hill Country, a 
land of mythic significance, could be of special use to him in his pursuance of a political 
career.  His ancestors were the people who made Texas.  Three years before his mother 
died, she told Lyndon the stories of his ancestors, and with these tales, gave him “the 
authenticated venerability of their ancestors.”22  
 The first Bunton to set foot in Texas had such a strong personality that those who 
met him never forgot him.23  John Wheeler Bunton, a hero of Texas Independence, signed 
the Texas Declaration of Independence.  Bunton left his family with two traits that came 
to characterize them: ambition and toughness.  In fact, ambition is the hallmark of what 
Caro refers to as the “Bunton strain.”  This strain was carried on by the next Bunton to go 
West: Lyndon’s great-grandfather, Robert Holmes Bunton.  The Buntons were unusual 
among frontier Texans in that they were “interested in ideas and abstractions.”24  
16
21 Caro, Path to Power, 40.
22 Dugger, The Politician, 27.
23 Caro, Path to Power, 4.
24 Caro, Path to Power, 6.  
Interested in ideas though they may have been, the Buntons also possessed a “hard, 
tough, practical side,” and the ability to be realistic about their big ideas.25  Perhaps this is 
the most important element of the Bunton strain.  Practicality made the Buntons adept at 
handling the difficult terrain of the Hill Country.
 The Johnsons, like the Buntons, also had grandiose dreams.  They thought they 
would “build an empire up in the hills.”26  The Johnsons wanted to be cattle ranchers, but 
they were too often frustrated with the difficult terrain of the Hill Country.  Sam Ealy 
Johnson Sr., Lyndon’s grandfather, was a Johnson to his very core.  Johnsons tended 
towards romanticism and extravagance, and had a larger than life temper.  Like the 
Buntons, they were big dreamers.  Sam Johnson Sr. married a Bunton, Eliza, a practical 
woman who believed “charity [began] at home.”27  While the Buntons had the ability to 
tailor their dreams to reality, the Johnsons were “not prudent and practical.”28  
 The Johnsons were representative of a phenomenon that occurred in post-Civil 
War Texas.  Texas enjoys a role as crucial part of what Americans imagine as the 
stereotypical Old West.  Americans tend to view Texas as a land where the rancher and 
heroic cowboy live.  This image is based upon the men that came to Texas pursuing big 
dreams.  The majority of men who came to Texas with the Johnsons in this post-war 
period from 1865-1890 were cattle ranchers.29  These men closed the Indian frontier all 
17
25 Ibid.  
26 Caro, Path to Power, 25.
27 Often, Eliza Bunton invited struggling members of the community to her home to offer food and a kind 
work.  Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 29.
28 Caro, Path to Power, 28.  
29 Randolph C. Campbell, Gone to Texas: A History of the Lone Star State, (Cary, NC: Oxford University 
Press: 2004), 290.
the while expanding the cattle frontier and contributed to the myth of Texas as a place 
that is western.
 Texans, including these cattle ranchers, took decisive action to rid the Texas 
frontier of buffalo and Indians so that this frontier could be a place for their cattle.  From 
1874-1880, these Texans engaged in battle with thousands of Comanches, Kiowas, and 
Southern Cheyennes.  By 1881, the vast majority of Indians were gone from Texas and 
the Hill Country.30  Through conquering these Indian foes and largely ridding the Texas 
frontier of buffalo, these men opened the way for Texans to raise cattle.  This is what 
brought the Johnsons to Texas and to the Buntons.
 Thus came the complicated mixture of the Bunton and Johnson strains.  The three 
sons of Sam Johnson and Eliza Bunton had fierce passion, high ambition, and potential 
for leadership, but they also possessed the “fatal taint” of the Johnson blood line:
 Johnsons, they said, had all of the Buntons’ temper, pride, arrogance, 
 and idealism, together with dreams even more ambitious, but they had
 none of the Bunton hardness, the canniness and pragmatism, that alone
 could keep idealism and ambition from bringing ruin in a country as 
 hard as the Hill Country.31  
This mixing of Bunton and Johnson strains is one of the most essential pieces in a 
complete understanding of the driving forces of Johnson’s life.  Lyndon Johnson was 
driven by massive ideas and goals, and possessed a Texas-sized ego to match.  
Fundamentally, he was the man he was because of the emphasis his family placed on 
these traits.
18
30 Campbell, Gone to Texas, 296.
31 Caro, Path to Power, 40.  
 To go into the rolling hills and dry soil of the Hill Country took courage and big 
dreams, something that Lyndon’s Johnson ancestors had in abundance.  It cannot be 
stressed strongly enough, however, that the Hill Country was not a landscape conducive 
to the fulfillment of dreams.  The reality of the Hill Country was rock.  For most people, 
and most particularly for farmers, rock is not conducive to dreams.  Rock is the opposite 
of conducive to dreams; rock is despair; rock is poverty; rock prevents crops from 
growing.  Those hoping to grow rich from this land had one of two choices: “plow it or 
graze cattle on it.”  If either of these things was done to the Hill Country, however, it 
would “blow or wash away.”32   
 “Principles, noble purposes, [and] high aims” were qualities not practical in the 
land of the Hill Country.  Unfortunately, these qualities were the most defining qualities 
of Lyndon’s ancestors.  Of a person, the land required an abandoning of all dreams and a 
strong, pragmatic approach to dealing practically with problems.  From this perspective, 
it seems clear the Johnsons were particularly unsuited to such a land.
 Sam Johnson Sr. lost his money betting on the future successes of the Hill 
Country.  This loss drove him to join the Populist movement.  Through the South and 
West, a sentiment grew among men, particularly farmers, who felt trapped by forces 
beyond their control: forces of nature and forces “too big for them to fight.”33  This was a 
time of desperation in Sam Johnson’s own life and in the lives of farmers in the Hill 
Country.  Generally, farmers believed it to be the duty of the government to deal with 
19
32 Caro, Path to Power, 25.  
33 Caro, Path to Power, 33.  
their issues because the government, through their “vast subsidies of land  and biased 
laws” were the reason for the farmers’ major problem: railroads.34  
 During the late 19th century, railroads served as western landlords.  Railroad 
companies owned massive tracts of land in the West, which they sold to farmers for a 
profit.  Farmers of the West were encouraged by these railroad companies to try their 
hand at growing cash crops in order to quickly repay the loans they took out to purchase 
their land.  Cash crops often proved profitable in the short-run.35 However in the long 
run, many farmers became dependent on single crops and their markets, and thus were 
overly sensitive to market fluctuations.36  Combined with the already difficult land of the 
Hill Country, this was economically disastrous to Hill Country farmers.  An article in the 
April 28, 1887 edition of the Progressive Farmer magazine summed up the attitude and 
concerns that drove farmers to join the Populist movement:
 There is something radically wrong in our industrial system. There is
  a screw loose. The wheels have dropped out of balance. The railroads 
 have never been so prosperous, and yet agriculture languishes. The banks 
 have never done a better or more profitable business, and yet agriculture 
 languishes. Manufacturing enterprises never made more money or were 
 in a more flourishing condition, and yet agriculture languishes. Towns 
 and cities flourish and ‘boom’ and grow and ‘boom,’ and yet agriculture 
 languishes. Salaries and fees were never so temptingly high and desirable, 
 and yet agriculture languishes.37
20
34 Caro, Path to Power, 36.  
35 The most common cash crop in Texas?  Cotton.  
36 Lawrence Goodwyn,  The Populist Movement: A Short History of the Agrarian Revolt in America.  (New 
York: Oxford University Press: 1978), 36.  
37 Kenneth G. McCarty, “Farmers and the Populist Party, 1870-1900,” Mississippi Historical Society.  
(http://mshistory.k12.ms.us/articles/163), accessed Match 5, 2012.
Here, we see enumerated the essence of the Populist movement.  Populism, and 
particularly the Texas Populism Sam Johnson participated in, was about the frustration of 
a group of people who felt that they were not getting a fair deal from the government.  It 
was a movement concerned with the growth of big business and the decline of 
agriculture.  The movement valued governmental assistance for farmers because it placed 
great importance on the role of agriculture in America.
 The Populist Party was the party of the people of the Hill Country.  The reality of 
the Hill Country was trying to scratch out a living with very few raw natural resources.  
This brutal reality made people of the Hill Country particularly susceptible to movements 
like Populism.  These were people who wanted their government to intervene and fight 
for them.  The Populist movement took the shape of a group of farmers oppressed by 
their land, wanting and needed governmental assistance in major ways.  From 
government, these people sought an advocate and a force that would protect them from 
the strengthening influence of big businesses.  The Hill Country was, quite literally, a 
frontier.  This Populist movement was the stuff of which popular Western entertainment 
was made.  These ideas were important to Sam Johnson Sr., and would remain important 
in the lives of his children and crucially, in the life of his grandson, Lyndon.  Populism 
was in Lyndon’s DNA.  
 The agrarian reform movement known as Populism found political expression in 
Texas as the People's party, which evolved from the Grange, the Greenback party, and the 
Farmers' Alliance into the most successful of the third-party movements in state history, 
though by 1900, it was largely incorporated into the Democratic party.  The program had 
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as its major demands the preservation of land from large and alien landowners, regulation 
of transportation, and increase of the amount of money in circulation.38  How money was 
created and circulated defined the relationship between farmers, urban workers, and big 
business.  This relationship defined who controlled the rules and the money, and 
determined which Americans made an income necessary to maintain “a living of some 
dignity.”39  The history of the People's party in Texas demands particular interest because 
the party benefited from a grass-roots communication structure.  Movement toward 
establishing a third party in Texas began in the late 1880s and culminated with the formal 
organization of a Texas People's party in 1891.  It was under this party that Sam Johnson 
Jr. ran for a seat in the House of Representatives.  Though Johnson lost, his political 
affiliations are of great importance in tracing Lyndon Johnson’s political development.  
Populism expressed an important vision for America’s future.  Johnson took elements of 
Populism with him, particularly elements that emphasized the value of the common man, 
and used them to great advantage in the development of his cowboy image.
 In addition to an examination of Populism, it is crucial to our understanding of 
Lyndon Johnson to pay special attention to the political moods of the place that shaped 
him.  Texas, and the Hill Country in particular, are places with deep political complexity 
and competing interests at work.   The world in which Lyndon Johnson came to political 
maturity was a changing one, but in Texas, the place from which Lyndon got his sense of 
political being, 19th century values that included racism, reigned supreme.
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 Texas is unique among states in that its history is treated with near equal 
importance to American history.  It has a reputation for producing national leaders, and it 
has a political climate all its own.  Though depictions of the frontier as an individualistic 
place are nothing more than the stuff of myth, perhaps because of their long history of 
struggle with the land and foreign occupiers of that land, Texans value individualism and 
self-sufficiency, and think of this as a characteristic of their frontier heritage.  Even today, 
candidates who come from Texas often wear cowboy hats and call themselves ranchers.  
All of this is a reflection of Texas as a place that is western. Fundamentally, however, 
Texas, at least since the beginning of the 20th century, has been caught between its 
southern and western political heritages.  Texas is a hugely complex place.  Any single 
list of qualities that we might label "Texan" will be partial, overly static, not applicable to 
everyone in the state, and maybe even internally contradictory.  Lyndon Johnson was 
born into this struggle, and this struggle shaped his politics.
 Between Reconstruction, the period after the American Civil War, and World War 
II, powerful interest groups dominated Texas politics.40  Forces like railroads, ranching, 
and later oil, gas, and sulfur exerted significant influence on state government.  These 
powerful, money-hungry industries rarely experienced any opposition in their quest for 
total domination of the political interests of the state, as most Texans had a certain 
fondness, or at least acceptance of the practice of big business and conservatism.  In this 
way, Texas was very much a southern place.  Johnson, however, descended from 
ancestors with an agricultural background.  
23
40 George Norris Green, The Establishment in Texas Politics: The Primitive Years, 1938-1957 (Westport, 
CN, 1979), 12.  
 The Populist movement, with which Lyndon’s grandfather was associated, 
occurred when the plight of the majority became so unbearable, a rebellion against the 
conservative forces that controlled Texas was in order.  The state, nearly without 
exception, fell back to conservatism because big business’ grip on the state was too tight 
for the little people— the farmers, the ranchers, and the working man—to overcome.41  
 The Texas in which Lyndon Johnson came to political maturity was a Texas that 
maintained the values of the Old South patron system.  The primary purpose of 
government in Texas was preservation of the social order.  The various strands of Texas 
political culture can be boiled down to three main ideological tendencies: economic 
liberalism (faith in a free market economy) combined with social conservatism (favoring 
traditional values and moralism), overlaid with populism (promoting the rights and 
worthiness of ordinary people).42  This is crucial—that the populism in which Lyndon 
Johnson and his family believed was about promoting and helping ordinary people.  
These tendencies intermingled and overlapped to create a turbulent political culture 
unique to Texas.
 The history of the Texas party system reflects the political heritage of the rest of 
the old South, including secession from the Union and racial segregation.  But the party 
system in Texas is also shaped by other equally important currents that it shares with 
western states, like its focus on concerns with issues like ranching, farming, and the 
problem of water.  Even today, historians don’t seem know just where  Texas fits.  
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Certainly Texas feels southern.  Texas history in inextricably linked the the history of the 
South.  Texas seceded with the South and maintained a southern perspective on race 
issues.  Populism is essential  to understanding the history of Texas as a state that has a 
western political culture.   Populism, fundamentally, is about the little man (in this case 
the farmer), standing up to government forces who seek to bleed him dry.  Populism is 
about taking a stand and fighting back.  
 Perhaps in actuality, Texas is more southern than western.  But here, the real 
question of importance is what Texans choose to identify with: a southern heritage or a 
western heritage.  Johnson’s ancestors and Johnson himself chose to identify with both 
Texas’ mythic and concrete western heritages.  Johnson, in his campaigns for elected 
office, saw political advantage in such identification.  When he discovered campaigns 
would be won or lost based on Populist appeals and the cultivation of a western image, he 
chose to de-emphasize the southern and play up the western.  Johnson’s identity was 
shaped by a place that is, in actuality, neither completely southern nor western.  In 
Johnson’s speeches and radio addresses to the people of Texas while running for 
Congress and the Senate, we don’t see him engage in the southern issues of the day.  He 
ignored issues of race entirely.  Instead, we see him engage with the problems faced by 
farmers and the symbolism of the West.  He spoke of bringing electrification to towns, 
controlling rivers and dams, and securing relief and aid for ranchers and farmers.  He 
didn’t act or dress like he was a part of the old boys network in the South.  Instead, he 
wore cowboy boots and took special care to be photographed around cattle and on a 
horse.  For Johnson, the answer was clear: Texas was a western space.
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 Sam Ealy Johnson Jr., son of Sam Ealy Johnson Sr., and father of Lyndon Baines 
Johnson, stayed in the Hill Country like his father before him.  Sam Jr. had ambitions to 
be something greater than a farmer.  He wanted to be a lawyer, but the realities of his life 
meant he needed to make money, so a cotton farmer he became.43  Despite the difficulty 
of the land, Sam Jr. had several successful years as a farmer.  Because of his success, 
image was of particular concern to Sam, who residents of the Hill Country recall 
frequently said, “you can tell a man by his boots and his hat and the horse he rides.”44  
 After several years as a farmer, Sam was nominated to represent the 89th District 
in the Texas House of Representatives.  Though nominated as a Democrat, “the Populist 
Party may have been dead, Populist principles weren’t.”45  Sam saw the concerns of the 
people of his district—their struggles with the land and their unease with railroad and oil 
companies and the ways in which  these businesses siphoned their profits— as 
fundamentally Populist concerns, so he addressed them as such and found success using 
this platform.  Though Sam was inexperienced, in the legislature, he found he had the an 
“unteachable gift for...persuasion.”46  Ultimately, Sam was “one of the few legislators 
who did not fail on a single measure.”47  
 1906 was a year of both great success and tumult in the life of Sam Johnson Jr.  
Reelected to the Legislature, Johnson gambled too much and went back to his job 
thousands of dollars in debt.  His second term was not wholly unsuccessful; Sam wished 
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to run for a third.  Other viewed him as a hard-worker and hero for his refusal to 
compromise Populist ideals.  Ultimately, what destroyed Sam Johnson’s chances for a 
long-lasting political career were these high ideals, for not all members of his district 
were sold on his appeals to Populism and farmers.  So, by the time Lyndon, his first child, 
was born, “Sam Johnson had lugged his dreams and ideals back to Hill Country,” and 
back to his wife, Rebekah Baines.48
    It is important to examine Lyndon’s relationship with his father, a relationship 
fraught with conflict, but at its core, a relationship of great admiration and respect.  Much 
of Lyndon’s behavior and motivations for behavior can be traced to the relationship he 
shared with his father, a relationship that changed before and after his father lost the 
Johnson family’s money.  
 In 1913 Sam and Rebekah Baines, Lyndon’s mother, moved their family to a 
three-bedroom home in Johnson City.  Johnson City was not a picturesque, wealthy, or 
exciting town, but attempts by historians to make it seem the definition of poverty are 
misguided.  Sam Johnson was a successful man by Johnson City standards.  When he 
made money, he used it to purchase more markers of wealth and success.  Sam bought 
expensive boots, Stetsons, and the “biggest and most expensive car in the whole Hill 
Country.”49  Image remained of utmost concern to Sam Johnson.  
 Most children seek attention, and in this respect, Lyndon Johnson was not unique.  
There are countless stories told by a myriad of people who knew him in any and all 
capacities to support this assertion.  What is more important, however, is how Sam 
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responded to Lyndon as a child.  During Lyndon’s youth, Sam Johnson was a model of 
fiery ambition and competitive spirit.  Lyndon sought to emulate his father, and 
succeeded in these ambitions by becoming even more competitive and aggressive than 
his father.50  Sam Johnson was a natural politician who, along with his wife, cared deeply 
about politics.  He fostered an environment for his children where passionate political 
discourse was the norm.  
 Sam Johnson returned to the Texas Legislature in 1918, but remained a farmer to 
make his money.  Sam began to deal in real estate and invested tens of thousands of 
dollars into a land that was fundamentally unstable and difficult to cultivate.51   By 1922, 
Sam Johnson was deep in debt.  He could hardly grow cotton, and the cotton he could 
grow would not sell because of reduced demand.52  He had an enormous mortgage, and 
owed the bank on money he borrowed to buy equipment for his farm.   This failure broke 
Sam Johnson as a man and changed him as a person.  No longer was Sam Johnson a 
respectable man in the eyes of the residents of Johnson City. In fact, the Johnsons became 
“the laughingstock of the town.”53
 The Johnsons were a family deeply concerned with image, and thus, were a 
family of great pride.  This economic fall, along with crippling his pride, changed how 
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Lyndon saw his father.  No longer did he want to emulate his father.  Instead, Lyndon 
sought to escape the ruin his father brought upon the family.  Lyndon went from carefully  
watching and emulating his father’s every move to going out of his way to be 
disobedient.  Lyndon’s ambitions were not halted by this economic downfall; rather, the 
economic fall was fuel for the flames of his burning desire to become important.   
Lyndon’s sharpest defiance to his parent’s wishes was in regards to his education, an area 
his parents found particularly important.54  For his first eight grades, Lyndon attended the 
Junction School.  For ninth grade, he went to the Albert School.  Lyndon caused 
disruption in the classroom, and often refused to do work, but teachers recognized his 
brilliant mind.55  As he progressed in his schooling, he continued his contentious 
relationship with his father which became wrecked with “an unusually violent strain of 
competition.”56  
 In the spring of 1924, Lyndon graduated from high school.   Desperately, 
Lyndon’s parents begged him to attend college, a clear road out the Johnson City they 
viewed through the lens of poverty.  Lyndon, still angry, refused.  Johnson refused to go 
to college because college was important to his parents.  He saw the value his parents 
assigned to their high ideals and the importance of college in achieving these ideals.  He 
saw what this had gotten them, and rejected college.  Instead of college, Lyndon went 
west to California.  
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 During his time in California, Lyndon worked in his cousin’s law office and lived 
in a “comfortable home.”57  Lyndon’s cousin Martin had an easy solution for Johnson’s 
lack of education.  He believed he could bypass several restrictions and make Lyndon a 
lawyer without attending college at all.  Ultimately this was not the case, and when 
Lyndon found out, he returned to Johnson City as a man marked by the heavy weight of 
disappointment, and possessing a new desire to secure an education that would lead to the 
kind of future he imagined for himself.  
 To say The Southwest Texas State Teachers College at San Marcos was not a 
college of high standards is incorrect.  The Southwest Texas State Teachers College was a 
college of lowest regard.  To call it a college at all at the time Lyndon attended, in 1927, 
requires a bit of hyperbole and suspension of disbelief.  At San Marcos, he wrote for the 
school paper.  Johnson excelled at debate, and was greatly influenced by the debate 
coach, H.M. Greene, who liked his ability to tear down the arguments of others.  In 1928, 
Lyndon’s financial status became too grim for continued attendance of college.  He 
dropped out of college to teach at a Mexican school in Cotulla, a job that paid $125 a 
month.58  
 In Cotulla, Lyndon experienced a type of poverty he had never encountered.  The 
children in Cotulla had no lunch hour because they had no lunches to eat.  In his work, 
Johnson was described as “a teacher Cotulla had never seen.”59  Johnson was raised with 
the (at the time) radical idea that ever person, right down to the struggling farmer, had 
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worth and deserved help to reach their potential.  Johnson cared if these children learned, 
and he devoted his intensity towards their education.  Johnson wanted to be the best, the 
most notable at everything he did.  But there was something different in his teaching 
years in Cotulla.  This intensity and ambition was coupled with an equally fierce pity and 
desire to help these poor children that can be tied to Johnson’s own experiences with 
Populism.
 As a teacher in Cotulla, Lyndon worked to secure better futures for the children at 
his school.  He purchased volleyball nets, sheet music for choir, and musical instruments.  
He attempted to foster an environment of competition at the school, and provided his 
students with opportunities to compete in “contests for spelling, speaking, and sports.”60  
Lyndon encouraged other teachers at the school to become as involved in the lives of 
their students as he was himself.  There is no real explanation offered by any historian as 
to why Johnson did these things for the children of Cotulla, and perhaps there is no true 
explanation to be had.  We will never understand Johnson’s complete motivations.  
However, what we do know about Johnson’s early life suggests that though Lyndon had a 
deep and powerful thirst for power and ambition, he also had some great desire to affect 
positive change in the lives of others and the political background in Populism to do it.  
According to Johnson himself, it was in Cotulla “that [his] dream began, of an 
America...where race, religion, language, and color didn’t count against you.”61  Johnson 
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dreamed of an America where the average person, any person, could succeed, and where 
the government was willing to take action to help people succeed.  
 Lyndon returned to San Marcos College in 1929 and immediately entered campus 
politics.  Johnson campaigned his way to senior class representative of Student Council, 
an election which he won by one, technically stolen, vote.62  This aggressive campaigning 
was a preview of the Lyndon Johnson who would run for the Senate in 1948.  It was at 
San Marcos that Lyndon first discovered his willingness to do what it took to win, and it 
was at San Marcos that Lyndon first won.  The most important message to take from 
Lyndon’s years at San Marcos is the early emergence of methods he would later use to 
win more serious elections:
 The desire to dominate, the need to dominate, to bend others to 
 his will—and the manifestation of that need, the overbearingness 
 with subordinates that was as striking as the obsequiousness with superiors
 had been evident at San Marcos.63
This desire, this need,  had to have come from something.  Was it because of the cruelties 
of the Hill Country that made Johnson into “a shape so hard it would never change?”64  
Was it the Populist principles he was exposed to and carried with him during his time in 
Cotulla?  Ultimately, it was a combination of these factors coupled with a growing 
awareness of what one must do, of the persona one must adopt, to successfully create a 
national identity with which to dominate the American political landscape.
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 After college, Johnson taught public speaking at Sam Houston High School.  
Johnson ran his debate team with, in what had already become a recurring theme in his 
life, boundless energy and soaring ambition.  Lyndon threw his whole self into his team.  
He had high standards for his pupils, and made sure they recognized he was the one who 
held control and power.  Johnson enjoyed his teaching job, but then he received a call 
from newly-elected Congressman Richard Kleberg, who wanted Johnson as his private 
secretary; Lyndon Johnson made his way to Washington.  
 Richard Kleberg was a wealthy man whose Congressional career is of little note.  
He had little interest in politics, and felt out of place in Washington.65  Lyndon had a 
sharp learning curve, and was among the most unsophisticated of the secretaries in 
Washington.  However, “once he knew how to do things in Washington, he started doing 
them—with...frenzied, driven, almost desperate energy...”66  In fact, because Kleberg 
simply didn’t care to do his job, once he found his footing, Lyndon was “congressman-in-
fact.  He ran the show.”67
 As Kleberg’s secretary, Johnson began work unusually early, and left work 
unusually late.  Johnson was able to make significant impact in Washington because of 
his hard work and convincing manner.  People respected him, including his boss, 
Congressmen Kleberg, who, though he did not believe in it, was persuaded by Johnson to 
vote for the New Deal.   Also notable in Johnson’s time as Kleberg’s secretary was his 
takeover of the “Little Congress,” an organization of House secretaries.  Johnson became 
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speaker of the Little Congress, and through this duty, learned “a good deal about the 
members of Congress—their enemies back home, drinking problems, and fears of the 
next election.”68  Even as mere secretary. Johnson used others to his advantage and 
gathered information that he recognized would be significantly helpful to his future.
 His growing reputation allowed secretary Johnson to make valuable connections 
that would serve his political career: “a network sprung up, a network of men linked by 
acquaintance with Lyndon Johnson, who were willing, because of Lyndon Johnson, to 
help one another.”69  Johnson created for himself a network of men who could and would 
help him in Texas.  
 While acting as secretary to Kleberg, Johnson enrolled at Georgetown Law 
School where he met his wife.  Lyndon asked Claudine “Lady Bird” Taylor to marry him 
the day they met.  Lady Bird came from a comfortable family, and their marriage in 1934 
was of political advantage to Lyndon because of the money that came with it.  Lady 
Bird’s entrance into Johnson’s life allowed him to make an important political ally: Sam 
Rayburn.  A friend of his father’s from the Texas Legislature, Rayburn was man with 
whom Lyndon tried to cultivate a significant a relationship.  These attempts were initially 
fruitless because Rayburn said he would bring his wife to dinner with a single man.  
However, after his marriage to Lady Bird, Lyndon could invite Rayburn to dinner.
 Johnson succeeded in breaking down Rayburn’s walls, and Rayburn quickly 
became something of a mentor and father figure to Johnson.  Most importantly, Rayburn 
was an activist on behalf of Lyndon Johnson.  It was Rayburn who lobbied Texas Senator 
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Tom Connally, who had a meaningful voice in selection of the position of Texas NYA 
director.70  Connally agreed to Rayburn’s proposition of making Johnson NYA director, 
but the White House refused to accept his recommendation.  So Sam Rayburn went to the 
White House, and though there is no record of what was said, with Rayburn’s help, 
Lyndon Johnson was made the NYA director for the state of Texas.71
 The National Youth Administration, or NYA, was established by President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt as a part of his New Deal in 1935 to “give students jobs to 
help them stay in school and to employ non-student youth in public works.”72   Johnson 
saw many benefits to his new position, and chief among these benefits was that  “he 
could build local and state-wide contacts for future campaigns.”73  Johnson approached 
his job as he had approached all others in his life.  He demanded a great deal of his 
employees, but he himself worked longer and harder than any of them.  The NYA 
program was on particular success in Texas.74
 As leader of the NYA in Texas, Johnson planned schoolyard construction and 
roadside parks projects that employed 15,000 youths in Texas.  In a move that was 
unusual for a Texas politician, but made sense in conjunction with the the populist ideals 
Johnson believed in—that all of the people, and especially the little people, have worth 
and deserve help—Johnson spread the benefits of the federal government’s assistance 
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beyond color boundaries.75  Perhaps Johnson viewed his position with the NYA as a way 
to build contacts, but this position also allowed him to help the disenfranchised.  In what 
would become another theme typical of his career, here, Johnson excelled in a position 
that allowed him to help others using the power of government.
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Chapter Two:
The Creation of Myth: From the Frontier to John Wayne
 Before one can begin an analysis of Lyndon Johnson’s use of cowboy and 
western myth, which began nearly immediately after his time as NYA director in Texas, 
one must first examine what precisely we mean when we say cowboy and western myth.  
The words “western” and “cowboy” conjure powerful imagery in the minds of 
Americans.  To be a cowboy is to be entrenched in a particular narrative that has been 
developed through literature and film in 19th, 20th, and 21st century America.  Lyndon 
Johnson understood these narratives and understood the strength they held.  Johnson 
knew that the cowboy narrative was a narrative accessible and appealing to all 
Americans, regardless of race, gender, or class. 
 Critical to our discussion of cowboy and western mythology is the 
frontier, that area of the American landscape that remained unsettled longer than any 
other.  Most important to the discussion of the importance of the American frontier is 
American historian Frederick Jackson Turner’s seminal essay, The Significance of the 
Frontier in American History.  Speaking to the American Historical Association in 1893 
at the World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago, Turner responded to a statement from 
the U. S. Census of 1890 that stated the American frontier had closed.  
 Turner’s thesis proposed that the American frontier explained why 
America developed in a distinctly different manner than European countries. He believed 
the fluid frontier situation coupled with a population facing new and unpredictable 
problems of the frontier not only forced them to be leaders, but also provided a variety of 
unique effects on American society.  Turner asserted that the frontier provided a type of 
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seeming boundless opportunity which prevented America from developing a class 
consciousness and encountering an acute class struggle— a struggle pervasive in most 
European countries.  Turner’s thesis proposed that the frontier also produced a uniquely 
American kind of democracy.  Turner’s thesis is the base on which the idea of American 
exceptionalism rests, and is the popular historiographic rationale for both “Republican 
progressives and Democratic liberals.”76 
 Through Turner’s thesis, we see the influence the frontier had on political 
thought and the emergence of political ideologies in America.  However, perhaps more 
powerful than even these ideologies is the mythology of the frontier, which is 
fundamentally the mythology of cowboys and the West.  The American frontier is the 
mythic birthplace of democracy in the West.  Texas contained frontiers longer than other 
American states, so Texas took on a role as a place of mythic significance in the West.  
Cowboys are real people and the West is a real place, but more important than these real 
places and people that are exist are the mythic importance we assign to these places and 
people.  In this way, because of this mythic significance, cowboys and the West have 
become much more than places and people.  They are cultural touchstones, accessible to 
nearly all people in America.  
 Myth is best defined as a story “drawn from a society’s history that have 
acquired through persistent usage the power of symbolizing that society’s ideology and of 
dramatizing its moral consciousness with all the complexities and contradictions that 
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consciousness may contain.”77  Over long periods of time, and through retellings that are 
passed through generations, these stories become “conventionalized and abstracted”  until 
they are reduced to “a deeply encoded and resonant set of symbols...”78  When we speak 
of the cowboy and western mythology, we are referring to a specific set of symbols that 
resonate with all Americans.  When Americans hear the word “cowboy” or “western” or 
“frontier,” they think of a specific set of images that color their understanding of an entire 
historical context.
 Fundamentally, myths exist to serve a culture.79  Myths are a production of 
society designed for the consumption of members of that society, so myths hold particular 
power in the society in which they were conceived.  As such, cowboy and western myths 
have particular poignancy among Americans.  Cowboy and western myths are pervasive, 
and exist in both mass media and folk culture.  Cowboy and western myths are at once 
national and local.  They are ideas rooted deep in the American consciousness, but are 
ideas that also have strong significance in Texas folk culture.  
 We must be clear what we mean when we refer to western and frontier 
mythology, for their are two myths of the frontier: a masculinized version: the myth of 
violence, individualism, and self-reliance and a feminized version: the community-
oriented, agricultural-focused strain of the myth.  When we speak of western mythology, 
we are speaking of these two narratives, both of which were important to Lyndon 
Johnson’s political image and style. 
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 The first of these frontier narratives is one of terrible violence.   This 
imagining of the violent frontier continues to provide patterns of identification and 
legitimization for a violent streak in American society:
 The savage enemy kills and terrorizes without limit . . . in 
 order to exterminate or drive out the civilized race (and) the 
 civilized race learns to respond in kind. A cycle of massacre 
 and revenge is thus inaugurated that drives both sides toward 
 a war of extermination.80
In this visioning of the frontier, frontiersman is gunfighter.  The frontiersman is 
concerned with domination, both of other cultures and of nature.  The notion of a savage 
warfare between frontiersman and Indian suggests a racist, and perhaps even genocidal 
imperative.  The frontiersman lacks a clear moral imperative.  The frontiersman, in this 
myth, takes on the role of morally ambiguous bandit.  Fundamentally, this version of the 
frontier myth is reliant on one critical assumption:
 the conquest of the wilderness and the subjugation or displacement 
 of the Native Americans who originally inhabited it have been the 
 means to our achievement of a national identity, a democratic 
 polity, an ever-expanding economy and a phenomenally dynamic 
 and 'progressive' civilization.81
Also central to this system of belief was a heavy emphasis on the necessity of violence 
through conquering other races to maintain social order for the greater good.  According 
to this version of the myth, we can only understand what it is that makes us Americans 
through the lens of violence.  We are asked to accept that our society is only successful 
when it exerts power over individuals or groups of individuals that do not belong.  This 
myth asks Americans to honor the men that facilitate subjugation and dominance.  
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 This violent frontier myth has disturbing implications both politically and 
for individuals.  Whereas early settlers and frontiersman could achieve fulfillment and a 
sense of progress through the conquering of new territories and annexation of new lands, 
once the frontier was closed, Americans were forced to look for new sorts of conquests, 
and this resulted in the discrimination and disenfranchisement of many groups of 
Americans, including the poor, racial minorities, and immigrants.  
 Additionally, American political leaders used this frontier myth of violence 
to justify involvement in foreign conflicts.  With the Spanish-American War and 
American involvement in the Philippines, President Theodore Roosevelt began the trend 
of allowing the frontier myth to color the world of foreign relations.  For Americans to 
keep their sense of progress, Roosevelt suggested they must take up the challenge of 
empire and bring civilization to third-world countries.  
 Later administrations would also invoke this violent frontier mythology to 
justify their involvement in foreign affairs. Particularly relevant is the example of the 
Johnson administration’s involvement in Vietnam.  The Johnson administration used the 
frontier myth of violence to rationalize and validate the United States’ escalation of 
combat forces in Vietnam.  This myth— that violence is permissible and even necessary 
to secure the United States’ continued dominance in the world— was a powerful tool for 
the Johnson administration to put a positive spin on unpopular policy decisions and 
military tactics.82
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 The feminized strain of the frontier myth, a more positive interpretation of 
the cowboy spirit and the frontier, places emphasis on an individual’s ability to struggle 
through a difficult environment.  This myth is more localized than the frontier myth of 
violence, and stresses the importance of working together and forming communities of 
self-reliance.  It focuses on the idea of bringing civilization to a place that has none, and 
through this civilization, bringing order and a type of self-government that is willing to 
help all people to be successful.
 The creation of this mythic figure in the feminized strain of the myth, this 
cowboy and frontiersman who rode into a town on his horse, and helped a community to 
work together towards self-reliance, was largely created in Texas folk culture, a culture 
that came to define America’s most central values.  Though this myth still presented 
cowboy and frontiersman as strong and capable of violence, in this interpretation of the 
myth, violence was not emphasized as a force that was crucial to the domination of other 
cultures and of nature.  Rather, violence, in this form of the myth, is presented as a means 
to an end, something to be avoided, but something that is justifiable if necessary.   The 
power of this western myth is that it does not celebrate violence; rather, it celebrates the 
coming of civilization to a place.83
 Where in the masculinized interpretation of the frontier myth there is 
gratuitous and racialized violence for violence’s sake, in the second strain of the myth, 
there is more emphasis on the figure of cowboy with a heightened sense of morality and 
duty to a community.  Additionally, it is in this form of the myth that symbols we 
42
83 Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 1950), 108.
associate with cowboys become meaningful.  Frontiersman is not primarily presented as 
gunslinger in this form of the myth.  Instead, he is presented as rancher and cowboy, 
someone who carries a gun, but would rather ride in on his horse and engage the enemy 
in a less violent way.  
 In this feminized version of the myth there is a focus on the agrarian over  
the Indian-hating gunfighter of the masculinized version of the myth.  In this form of the 
myth, there is respect afforded to men who value agriculture and the land.  The focus is 
placed on the man who acquires a title to a farm and raises his children to value and 
respect the wilderness.84  In the feminized version of the myth the agrarian utopia is 
emphasized: a place where farmers are valued and children grow up to respect the land 
and continue an agricultural tradition.  Implicit in the form of myth is a deep respect for 
land and nature.  There is no emphasis placed on domination or subjugation of others.  
Rather, emphasis is placed upon the strength of the agricultural community, banding 
together to create a place where civilization and nature can coexist.  This kind of 
“garden,” a nature fenced in by the cooperative civilization brought by farmers to a land 
is a crucial element of the feminized strain of frontier myth.85 
 The masculinized frontier myth was a theme important to Johnson’s later 
career and strategical decisions in Vietnam, and it provides the lens through which most 
historians analyze Lyndon Johnson.  However, the feminized strain of the frontier myth is 
the myth from which Johnson drew in his early political career.  If we ignore the hold that 
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this first myth had on Johnson is his campaigns for Congress and the Senate, we ignore a 
vital piece of Johnson’s history, explanation for his hold on the American public, and his 
comfort with expressing ideals of cowboy masculinity in his work in politics.   
 The mythology of the frontier was largely created by those who were 
outsiders to the frontier.86  As such, the origins of this folklore are complex and not 
always entirely accurate.  It is not necessarily accuracy that matters, however, for what is 
disseminated in a culture— what all in a culture are exposed to in all forms of media, 
sometimes in versions that are presented as fact—is what becomes true of a culture.  
Cowboys did not conquer the frontier.  Not all cowboys wore boots or Stetson hats.  
However, because of mass media and folk culture’s dissemination of these myths, these 
myths have become akin to historical fact.
 It is also crucial to note that these western myths were also created and 
widely disseminated through popular culture including pulp fiction, television, and film.    
The first and most notable novel of the western fiction genre was Owen Wister’s The 
Virginian.  Written in 1902 and set in the Wild West, Wister’s novel was the first true 
western written other than tiny dime novels.  The novel describes the life of a foreman of 
a ranch in Wyoming.  It is narrated by an unnamed narrator, and chronicles that narrator’s 
reactions to a rancher known simply as the Virginian.  The character is terribly violent.   
At one point in the novel, the Virginian must participate in the hanging of a cattle thief 
who had been one of his good friends.  The hanging is depicted as a necessary response 
to the government's corruption and lack of action, so the Virginian carries through 
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because of a sense of duty and obligation.  The Virginian can also be read, however, as 
the tale of a stakeholder coming into a territory and bringing civilization that is 
uncorrupted by government influence to that territory.  At once, pulp fiction could 
embody both strains of the myth.  
 Wister’s work paved the way for future generations of writers to define the 
narrative structure of the western genre.  It is through these novels that the western 
became formulaic.  In particular, Zane Grey’s Riders of the Purple Sage contributed to 
what Americans imagine when they think of cowboy.  Grey wrote Riders of the Purple 
Sage in 1912.  The novel is set in Utah, so the force of antagonism in the novel is 
religion, in this case, Mormonism.  The character Lassiter, who dresses all in black and 
rides in on his horse to restore order, is protagonist of the tale.  Depicted as morally 
ambiguous, Lassiter represents both virtue and vice at once.   
 Grey describes Lasseter as a gentle-voiced and sad-faced man who is a 
hater and killer of Mormons.  This description seems contradictory, but here we see the 
contradictory nature of the cowboy narrative.  In novels and narratives like The Virginian 
and Riders of the Purple Sage, heroes of the story are not all good.  Instead, they are 
complicated human beings, at once morally upstanding and willing to kill to enforce 
justice in a lawless land.  Ultimately, we almost always view these heroes positively, and 
there are greater implications in our world for this attitude.  Because of cowboy tales, and 
this cowboy narrative that includes violence, we learn to see violence as a necessary 
means to an end, even for those that are morally upright and seek to bring order and 
safety to a place.
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 This narrative structure continued in movies of the 1900s for “from 
roughly 1900 to 1975 a significant portion of the adolescent male population spent every 
Saturday afternoon at the movies.  What they saw were Westerns.”87  Lyndon Johnson 
was one of these boys.  Johnson descended from a long line of frontiersman.  He lived an 
authentic cowboy experience, but simultaneously he was exposed to the media’s portrayal 
of the West, a portrayal than involved one man more than any other: John Wayne.  The 
most popular movie star in America, even after his death, was John Wayne.88  John 
Wayne was the actor most synonymous with the western genre of film.  His image will 
forever be denotative of what it means to be a cowboy— that is, what it means to walk 
and talk like a cowboy.  Without John Wayne and the western films he made, there would 
be no consistent pictorial representation of what it means to be a cowboy.  John Wayne is 
a major reason why the signifiers of the West are so significant to Americans.  They are 
all present in his portrayals of cowboys.
 Perhaps most powerful in his portrayal is Wayne’s stance.  When he 
played a cowboy, Wanye looked unconquerable. Before Wayne, the figures that stood for 
the west and the frontier experience, figures like Daniel Boone, Davy Crockett, Buffalo 
Bill, were rooted in fact that turned into myth.  Wayne’s portrayal of cowboy was entirely  
rooted in myth, but for many Americans, became more true than an actual cowboy 
experience.  Wayne was so easily identifiable as a westerner that he became another 
symbol of the West.  When we think of the posture of a cowboy, we think of Wayne,
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 Other actors need to be built up- by camera angles, lighting, 
 costume, blocking of crowds, suppression of others’ positions-
 in order to command the scene.  Wayne’s power was such 
 that others had to be built up to give him credible opposition.
Wayne had a powerful on-screen presence.  He was tall and strong, overwhelming on 
screen.  The Stetson hats he frequently wore only contributed to this height and feeling of 
overbearingness.  Fundamentally, the Western deals with the taming of the West, and 
Wayne was a convincing tamer because of his inherent strength.  
 Additionally, Wayne had what looked like effortless control over his 
enormous body.  His actions, even actions that demonstrated enormous power, looked 
casual and controlled.  There is something overpoweringly sexual about the way Wayne 
interacted with the western environment: the way he rode his horse and the way he stood 
with his hands on his hips and pelvis thrust slightly forward.  All of these actions worked 
to draw attention to the fundamental feature of Wayne’s masculinity: his penis.  There is 
enormous power in this type of swagger.  Wayne looked confident in his masculinity.    
Wayne sexualized cowboy, and this sexualization added power to a myth already strong 
in the minds of Americans.  After Wayne, cowboy was firmly solidified as a masculine 
role.  The role’s physicality became just important as the narrative structure had been to 
novels.  To be a cowboy, a penis, and a pretty big one at that, was necessary.
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Figure 2: John Wayne
 Wayne shows off his signature cowboy posture, Stetson on his head. steed behind him.89
 It is also important to note elements of Wayne’s performance as cowboy 
that became signifiers and symbols of what it means to be western.  In his films, Wayne 
always wore a large Stetson, adding height and a sense of masculinity.  His feet were 
constantly in cowboy boots, and he entered the scene on his faithful steed.  He looked at 
one with nature, almost like he grew out of the environment.  To be a cowboy, at least in 
Wayne’s sense of the word cowboy one had to be tough, hard, and unforgiving.  These 
symbols are powerful and resonant, because Americans saw them time and time again.  
The reality of the these symbols does not matter.  What matters is what they evoke, and 
they evoke cowboy.    
 Westerns were accessible to Americans of all economic classes, age 
groups, and genders.  Because of this, Westerns, and cowboys, the heroes of Westerns, 
48
89 http://westernposterpage.com/wayne.htm
became the basis for imagining a national hero.90  Lyndon Johnson discovered this, 
maybe really always knew it, and used it as the basis for the creation of a national 
political identity, an identity that was so successful because it could reach all Americans.  
Johnson knew western narrative.  He knew the power of  the feminized strain of the myth 
he chose to emphasize—a group of resilient people, banding together working to achieve 
the common goal of success for all.  Additionally, Johnson’s image centered around the 
symbols and signifiers of the west: a cowboy hat, cowboy boots, a horse, a ranch, and an 
overwhelmingly masculine presence.  We see this message come through loud and clear 
in his campaigns for the House and Senate.  
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Chapter Three:
First Defeat & Lessons Learned
 
 By the time Roosevelt decided to run for a third-term, anti-New Deal sentiment in 
Texas began to manifest itself in a number of strange ways.  Perhaps the strangest 
expression of this anti-New Deal sentiment came in the form of the political career of one 
W. Lee “Pappy” O’Daniel.  O’Daniel and his electoral success represented the power of 
an appeal to the common people—a lesson Johnson should have learned from his early 
exposure to Populist ideals.  O’Daniel’s electoral victory against Johnson inspired in 
Johnson an understanding of the benefits of a conscious manipulation of the ideals that 
were so deeply entrenched in his being.  Through his manipulation of language, image, 
and use of new media to disseminate his message, O’Daniel exposed Johnson to a new 
type of politician—one who valued image over message.
 In 1937 when James Buchanan, a Congressman from the Tenth District of Texas, 
died, Lyndon resigned from his post to run for the House Seat, thus moving from 
administrative to electoral politics.  Along the way, Johnson learned valuable lessons 
about the nature of politics and the electorate—and Johnson was a fast learner.  Alvin J. 
Wirtz, a Texan who admired Johnson’s tenacity, was one of the most important advisers 
to Johnson’s 1937 campaign.  Once a member of the Texas Senate, Wirtz was a proponent 
of FDR’s New Deal, and knew Johnson was an ideal candidate to express these ideals in 
Washington.91  
 Central to Johnson’s strategy was running on a platform of the New Deal.  
Nationally, Franklin Roosevelt was an overwhelmingly popular president.  Johnson 
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recognized any identification with a man so popular would be politically advantageous, 
so from day one, he ran his campaign as a surrogate Roosevelt.  He made clear he was the 
candidate with closest ties to Roosevelt.
 A close examination of  the twenty-four radio addresses and speeches from the 
1937 campaign available at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library & Museum in Austin, 
TX, reveals a clear initial strategy at play—complete and total support of President 
Roosevelt and the New Deal.  In a full twenty of the twenty-four speeches he delivered 
during the campaign, Johnson spoke to a platform with two planks: first, the needs of 
every member of the tenth district, and second, unequivocal support of President 
Roosevelt, his administration, and his policies.92  Johnson never attempted to support a 
program not supported by the President, or even to distinguish himself in any meaningful 
way from the President.
  I believe this District should have as its representative in Congress 
  a man who is  wholeheartedly committed to support of the President’s 
  entire New Deal program.  Let me make it plain that I am for every 
  part of it...93
Johnson told the District he wanted to represent in no uncertain terms, he would represent  
them as a sort of surrogate for the President, supporting issues the President would also 
support.  He focused on only the most national of issues, the New Deal.  
 Indeed, Johnson, in his radio addresses, made clear that the central issue of the 
campaign, the only issue that mattered really, was full support for the President. 
  When we get down to the facts in the matter, there is only one 
51
92 Autin, TX, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library & Museum, Speech Files, 1937.
93 Lyndon B. Johnson. "Address Over KNOW, 11 March 1937," Speech Files, 1937, Lyndon Baines 
Johnson Library & Museum, Speech Files, 1937.
  issue in this campaign.  Are you for the President, or against him?  
  Are you going to let the President down?  The Tenth District 
  knows that.  The Nation knows that.  It awaits and expects a 
  thumping verdict: ‘We are for him.  We won’t let the President 
  down.’94
Johnson’s strategy demonstrates that from very early in his career as a public political 
figure, he recognized the importance of employing a particular political personality to 
capitalize on a national mood.  What is important to note here is that Johnson does not 
delve into specifics of policy.  Instead, he makes an emotional appeal to members of the 
Tenth District centered around a very popular president.  Here was Johnson’s recognition 
of the need to run on a national platform.  The political climate of the nation leaned 
towards support of President Roosevelt, so Lyndon also supported President Roosevelt.  
He won the election decisively.  
 The special election he won in 1937 for Congressman in the Tenth Congressional 
District of Texas marked a turning point in strategy for Congressman Johnson.  Before 
and in 1937, it was advantageous for Johnson to run for office as a nationally-minded 
political figure because of the enormous popularity of President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt and the depth of economic problems facing the nation as a whole.  Johnson 
was product of the New Deal era, an era of the creation of an America mindful of 
primarily national issues.  After 1937 however, Johnson fundamentally altered the way he 
conducted politics for the rest of his life.  What Johnson strove to do was turn local into 
national.  Fundamentally, Johnson sought to make the problems of the West the problems 
of the nation.  
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 In 1937, Johnson’s support came from the land where he was born: the Texas Hill 
Country, but also, perhaps more surprisingly, the rest of West Texas.95  Johnson must 
have been pleased by this victory, but he also recognized that it was not a personal 
victory in support of his own policies or western policies; rather, it was a victory for the 
policies of President Roosevelt. However, Johnson also recognized he was situated in a 
position where he could work to develop a new national strategy—a strategy to make 
problems of the West problems of the nation.  This was the strategy that would become 
beneficial to Johnson in his manipulation of western and cowboy mythology.  To solve 
problems facing the West, Americans needed a cowboy.
 Johnson, from Texas as he was, had a decision to make.  He could present himself 
as a southerner and vote with southern congressmen, or he could ally himself with the 
growing western voting bloc in Congress.  As a congressman, Johnson fought for his 
constituents, and his efforts were focused primarily on problems that were traditionally 
considered western, most particularly the issues of water and power lines: “the story of 
Lyndon Johnson is the story of the electric wires...which linked the life of the West, as 
railroad has linked its commerce, to the rest of America—for it was Lyndon Johnson who 
brought those wires to the Hill Country.”96  Additionally, Johnson differed from his 
southern counterparts on the issue of race.  While it cannot be said Johnson was 
progressive on issues of race, it is noteworthy that “as long as [Johnson] could not be 
seem helping blacks...he helped them.”97  
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 Johnson became more closely tied than ever to the presidency of Roosevelt upon 
the backdrop of one of the greatest political feuds of the era: that of Roosevelt and his 
Vice-President, John Nance Garner.  In 1939, Garner disapproved of Roosevelt’s desire to 
run for a third-term, and of his expansive government.  The conflict intensified when 
Roosevelt attempted to expand the size of the Supreme Court.  Roosevelt’s appointments 
to the enlarged court could have prevented the blocking of New Deal legislation.98  
Roosevelt needed an ally powerful in Texas.  A logical first choice might have been 
Johnson’s mentor, Sam Rayburn.  But Rayburn, out of longstanding loyalty to Garner, 
would not support the President.99  Johnson ultimately ingratiated himself to the President 
by becoming something of a spy in the delegation of Texas congressmen.  
 In Texas, Lyndon Johnson’s brand of liberalism, which supported the relief and 
recovery programs of the New Deal, had not completely disappeared in the 1930s.  Most 
Texas congressman still supported rural electrification, conservation, and tax relief for 
lower classes.100  Labor laws that came with the New Deal were frequently unopposed, 
because they had little impact on the lives of rural Texans.  In 1941, Johnson could afford 
to run as a liberal Democrat because full blown conservatism—and the demands from oil, 
gas, and other corporate interests that came with it—had not yet completely overtaken 
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Texas.101  It is important to consider, however, that Texas possessed a relatively stable 
economy, which aided to the conservative branch of the Democrats’ ascent to power in 
the state.  Less Texans were vulnerable and required the aid that New Deal programs 
offered.  
 Johnson was “Roosevelt’s man in Texas—but he was not only Roosevelt’s 
man.”102  Perhaps if Johnson had recognized this fact, his failed senatorial campaign in 
1941 to fill the seat of the deceased Senator Sheppard would not have been unsuccessful.  
Though Johnson may have had a growing network of support in Texas,  this network of 
support was not enough to help him win an election against a formidable opponent, one 
whose successful campaign and recognition of the value of western mythology and Texas 
folklore would help to solidify Johnson’s own national strategies: W. Lee “Pappy” 
O’Daniel.  
 Johnson recognized his best strategy going into this race was to do what he had 
done to be elected to the House: to tie himself as closely as possible to President 
Roosevelt, who remained very popular in Texas.103 As he entered the 1941 election, 
Johnson faced significant disadvantages.  There were several candidates in the running 
for the seat who had name-recognition throughout Texas.  However, Johnson knew if he 
tied himself to the President, he could quickly establish a name and viable platform.  
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Johnson announced his candidacy for Senate on the steps of the White House.104  The 
most important thing to take from Johnson’s strategy in 1941 is that “in 1941, as in 
1937...the Johnson campaign consisted of a single issue: ‘Roosevelt, Roosevelt, 
Roosevelt.’”105  Johnson gave speeches espousing his deep connection to Roosevelt, and 
used as billboard a photo of he and Roosevelt shaking hands.  Roosevelt himself played 
an active role in the race, volunteering Harold Young, his Vice-President’s aid, to 
Johnson’s campaign.  Additionally, Johnson was not lacking in money, money which 
primarily came from contracting and engineering firm, Brown & Root, who had worked 
with and for Johnson in his years as congressman.  Brown & Root won the contract to 
build many of the power lines that electrified the Hill Country.106  Johnson was the reason 
that Brown & Root had their contract, and they were understandably grateful.   Though 
Brown & Root could not legally contribute to the campaign, ultimately, they expressed 
their approval of Congressman Johnson through the gift of hundreds of thousands of 
dollars.107  
 Johnson struck a confident figure compared to the man who had run for office in 
1937.  He was more polished a candidate, wore “a fedora instead of a Stetson,” and 
generally, attempted to look like he belonged in the Senate.108  Here was a Johnson who 
did not attempt to appeal to any western base of support.  He didn’t mention river 
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projects, rural electrification, or agricultural issues outside of their relationship to the 
New Deal.  Instead, Johnson focused on letting his New Deal votes speak for him.  
Johnson supported public power, work relief, conservation, and agricultural price 
supports.109  Because his Roosevelt strategy worked for him in 1937, Johnson did not yet 
recognize the need for a new strategy, nor the value of a more folksy approach.  The 
entrance into the race of Pappy O’Daniel, then Governor of Texas,  changed everything.
 Pappy O’Daniel was not a Texan by birth.  Born in Ohio, O’Daniel spent much of 
his early life in Kansas.  Before his run for Governor in 1938, O’Daniel was a flour 
salesman and radio personality.  O’Daniel began writing jingles for the radio to sell his 
flour, and eventually began writing songs that were not to sell flour, but were to honor 
Texas, Texans, and the heroes of Texas: cowboys.110 
 In 1938, most Texans still lived on farms, and even those farm boys
 who had recently arrived in the state’s fast-growing cities were still
 farm boys, whose customs, tastes, vocabulary, and view of life were
 those of country people.  This view was simplistic, homespun, and 
 very, very firm.111
In addition to hillbilly songs, on his radio show O’Daniel gave religious talks, lectured 
listeners on morality, and recounted tall tales of Texan heroics.112  O’Daniel’s fans began 
writing letters to him, begging him to run for Governor.  Eventually, there were so many 
requests that he asked people—in a broadcast on Palm Sunday, no less—to write to him if 
they believed he would make a good Governor for Texas.  O’Daniel received “messages 
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from over fifty-four thousand people asking him to run, four advising him not to run.”113  
O’Daniel announced his candidacy for Governor of Texas in May 1938.  
 By late June, it was apparent that O’Daniel’s political aspirations, which the 
media assumed were ridiculous dreams, were not quite so far-fetched because of the 
power of his populist message.  O’Daniel successfully presented himself as an average 
person who just happened to be concerned about the lives of other average people.  He 
recognized something powerful in the electorate that everyone else missed.  
Accompanied by “his hillbilly band and the scripture,” he drew larger, more enthusiastic 
crowds than any other candidate running for election.114  The New York Times recorded a 
conversation O’Daniel had with a man at a Fort Worth Rally.  The man called him “a 
Yankee carpetbagger from Ohio.”  O’Daniel responded that he “came to Texas fifteen 
years ago,” and emphasized that he came because “[he] wanted to be here, [he] wanted to 
be one of you common folk.”115
 O’Daniel presented himself as one of the people, even though he was not, and the 
populist message mingled with religion resonated with voters116   O’Daniel made clear, 
through his interactions with people, that he was “tired of politicians,” and added that 
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“[he was] not one of them.”117  O’Daniel received a majority of the votes cast in the 
election, eliminating the need for a runoff.118
 Here, is perhaps the idea most fundamental to Johnson’s necessary shift in 
strategy.  Ultimately, O’Daniel prevailed in the 1941 election because he understood the 
folk culture and long history associated with the frontier, Texas, and its people.  He 
understood the hold that mythic concepts, regardless of truth, had over the people of 
Texas.  This is something that everyone else missed.  Arguably, O’Daniel created the first 
true mythic campaign in American politics.  O’Daniel represented the consumate 
Washington outside, Johnson the insider.  The outsider had an important lesson to teach.  
Lyndon Johnson learned this lesson, and took this strategy to a national level.  It is 
important to understand, however, that Pappy O’Daniel did it first, and that Pappy 
O’Daniel outmaneuvered even the cunning Lyndon Johnson in Texas.  O’Daniel was 
underestimated by everyone, and he still won.  
 O’Daniel found strength in the farmers of Texas.  He used a fatherly voice and 
religious undertones to maintain his wide appeal.  O’Daniel presented himself as a true 
Texan, above politics, and just one of the “common citizens.”119  These sorts of appeals 
sound strikingly like the appeals Johnson would use in later campaigns, not at all similar 
to the Lyndon Johnson present in the 1941 senatorial election.  
 Before O’Daniel entered the race, Johnson was all business: buttoned-up suits and 
fancy neckties.  After he realized the source of O’Daniel’s popularity, however, Johnson 
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changed tactic.  Johnson tried, unsuccessfully to become more like Pappy O’Daniel.  
Gone were the days of espousing the policies of Roosevelt and Roosevelt only.:
 ...the dark suits of had been replaced by Texas white; the jackets 
 of the suits hung open, or were taken off, exposing sweat-stained, 
 rumpled shirts; his neckties were the ties of the Hill Country again,
 not of Capitol Hill...the unfashionably short mail-order neckwear of 
 the countryman; their knots, loosened in the heat of campaigning, 
 dangled from an open, sweat-wilted collar.120
 
 After O’Daniel, Lyndon simultaneously became an advocate for farmers, drew 
upon his “country boy” roots, and attempted to maintain support for President Roosevelt 
and the New Deal.  Through  populist appeals, he tried to remind the people of the Tenth 
District that he was one of them: a country boy from simple roots.  He wanted them to 
know that he understood the importance of farmers and ranchers.  He tried to relate to 
them in the way the O’Daniel so successfully related to them in his campaign for 
Governor.  At the same time, he remained conscious of the national mood of the country.  
He never completely dropped the message that he stood behind Roosevelt, and that was 
the driving force of his campaign.  At once, he encouraged farmers and ranchers to 
democracy, and rallied them around a national figure, President Roosevelt. 
 In my country-boy way of thinking, there is nothing so democratic 
 in the whole world as a meeting like this, where our farm and ranch 
 and town people are gathered together...to show America and the 
 whole world that you are one hundred percent behind Roosevelt and 
 unity and Lyndon Johnson.121
 In his radio addresses from June, the very month O’Daniel’s support began to 
swell, Johnson began to us western and farm-related talking points with increasing 
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frequency, abandoning a strategy that focused solely on solidarity with Roosevelt and the 
New Deal.122  Johnson enumerated the problems of the west, and showed personal 
concern with the problems of his constituents, something he did not do in the election he 
won in 1937.  He empathized with the real, daily life problems of his would-be 
constituents.  Johnson knew of the significance soil, water,  rural electrification, and 
livestock had with these people.  So he borrowed from O’Daniel’s tactics and began to 
use western populism
 We don’t talk jobs and labor problems and rural electrification, 
 and flood control, soil conservation, farm interest rates, and 
 sheep, goats, cattle, and hogs, like something that exists somewhere 
 else, because all those things are daily bread for us and when 
 something goes wrong with them we don’t eat.123
 In the same radio address, and in several others delivered later that week, Johnson 
implored voters not to “vote for hillbilly music,” but instead, to “vote for the man whose 
record shows you he’ll do the most for you.”124  This was a direct attack against O’Daniel 
and his folksy approach.  Clearly, if Johnson felt it necessary to attack O’Daniel on style, 
he understood the value of this style.  At this stage, however, Johnson’s primary concern 
remained full support of Roosevelt and the national agenda of the day.  
 Johnson’s last address, delivered immediately before election night, is notable in 
that it both pays thanks to mythic western figures, and ends with its emphasis on 
Roosevelt.  Johnson argued that farmers and ranchers, figures of mythic importance, were 
on his side, and not O’Daniel’s in the campaign.  He goes on to say that these men have 
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set an example for all of America.  He made the appeal that these men, their code of 
ethics, their standards of living, their ideas of what is right in politics, are ideas that the 
nation at large should adopt.  Johnson took western symbols and tried to make them 
symbols of national significance.  Importantly, however, Johnson ended this campaign 
with an appeal to national unity and Roosevelt noticeably tacked on  to the end of his 
speech.  This is a reflection of Johnson’s discomfort with completely abandoning a 
platform he knew was national, a platform he was certain of the country’s faith in. 
 Tonight I humbly thank the farmers and ranchers who, 
 recognizing the peril we face, have worked day and night in this 
 campaign.  I thank the laboring men of Texas...They have set a 
 standard for all America to copy.  They believe in Roosevelt and 
 unity and Lyndon Johnson.”
 Johnson lost the election by a margin of only 1,311, almost certainly stolen 
votes.125126  The election represented a crucial shift in strategy for Johnson.  For the first 
time, Johnson recognized that Pappy’s western persona, his appeals to farmers, cowboys, 
and the working people of Texas, meant more than his own promises to stand behind 
Roosevelt.  In the end, it proved more important to talk about how you were one of the 
people than to talk about what you could do for them.  Johnson recognized the connection 
between these appeals, myth, and the populist ideals he had internalized his entire life.  
The national mood was not static, and currently, the national mood was changing.  Heads 
were turning westward.  In this election, Johnson saw the importance and potential 
national resonance of local politics.  Pappy O’Daniel won a senatorial campaign with 
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local politics.  Perhaps, if used properly, there would be no limit to what local politics, 
and particularly western politics, could achieve in Johnson’s capable hands.
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Chapter Four:
1941-1947:
Politics, Patriotism, and the Solidification of a National Image
 Lyndon Johnson did not accept defeat easily.  He later recalled the months after 
his defeat at the hands of folksy Pappy O’Daniel as “the most miserable in [his] life.  
[He] began to think about leaving politics and going home to make money.”127  Of 
course, Johnson was prone to exaggeration, so we may never know if this was a real 
feeling of discouragement or simply a story designed to add to the mythology of a 
cowboy who overcame terrible obstacles.  What we do know, however, is how Johnson 
responded to defeat.  Recovering quickly, he made decisive changes to create a new 
image in national politics.  In 1941, Johnson discovered Franklin Roosevelt’s blessing 
was no longer enough to win in Texas.  He also found, however, that cowboy and western 
mythology, the symbols he was raised with and the values that were born in him, could be 
used to great effect in Texas.  It was during this period that Johnson began to consciously 
and successfully manipulate symbols and values of the frontier, ideas he had internalized 
his entire life.  Johnson emphasized more strongly than ever before the important role 
that the frontier myth of community and cooperation could play in politics.  
 Lyndon Johnson was Franklin Roosevelt’s man through and through—until 
association with Roosevelt became politically disadvantageous.  Johnson’s loyalty to 
Roosevelt in his 1937 and 1941 campaigns cannot be overemphasized; Roosevelt’s New 
Deal platform was the only platform with which Johnson was concerned.  In 1937, this 
strategy was incredibly effective because the New Deal was overwhelmingly popular in 
64
127 Robert Dallek, Lone Star Rising, (New York: Oxford University Press: 1991), 225.
Texas.  It is important to note, however, that by 1941, there were significant opponents of 
the New Deal in Texas.  As early as July 1941, anti-Roosevelt Democrats formulated 
plans to defeat New Dealers in 1944.128  Deep divisions in the Texas Democratic Party 
based largely on negative response to New Deal economic philosophy that involved 
heavy federal spending, led to a fear among Roosevelt supporters that Texas would be 
decisive in preventing President Roosevelt’s fourth term.129  
 O’Daniel succeeded in 1941 by tapping into this sentiment.  But he was also able 
to anticipate the mood of Texans and tap into their own myths to reach them.  O’Daniel 
realized something that even Johnson did not—the significance of making Texans feel 
not only that a politician should work for them, but also that he himself was one of them.  
Crucial to this concept was Texas folk-culture, and in this area, O’Daniel was a master.  
Johnson needed to learn to adapt.
 In 1942, Johnson, no longer discouraged, was in good shape to face O’Daniel 
again, this time in the Democratic primary for O’Daniel’s full six-year term.  Johnson’s 
plans, however, were derailed by Pearl Harbor.  At the outbreak of war, Johnson pledged 
to serve, which made running in the 1942 primary an impossibility.  He would wait until 
1948 for his next chance at the Senate  This six-year gap gave Johnson an important 
chance to cultivate his populist and cowboy image through his politics in Congress.
 In the summer of 1942, Johnson took an approved leave of absence from his 
House seat and entered the Navy to work on “production and manpower problems” that 
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were slowing the nation’s output of planes and ships.130  Johnson was assigned to the 
Under Secretary’s office and took responsibility for production of military vehicles on the 
West and Southwest.131   We see strains of frontier mythology in Johnson’s sense of duty 
to the President in his task, for he believed that if he only had the authority, he had a 
working solution to the problem, which involved group effort and cooperation.   This 
group effort and cooperation is precisely what we mean when we speak of the feminized, 
agrarian version of frontier myth.  Johnson brought his belief in this myth to his work in 
the Navy.  
 Johnson’s boredom led him to a decision to seek a larger, more personally 
meaningful role in the war that had derailed his political prospects.  With wife Lady Bird 
supervising his Washington office, Johnson won an uncontested victory in the 
Democratic primary for his House seat and was sent, by direct order of President 
Roosevelt, to the Southwest Pacific front.132  Through his service, Johnson got a taste of 
combat that tested his cowboy mettle and gave him a new story to add the the personal 
mythology he aimed to cultivate.  This story emphasized the depth of his commitment to 
the most important community he was a member of—The United States of America.
 Even in his military career, internalized aspects of the frontier myth were clearly 
evident in Johnson’s behavior and opinions about particular policies.  Through his 
experiences in the military, Johnson had the opportunity to rub shoulders with incredibly 
powerful men, including General Douglas MacArthur.  Johnson became a major advocate 
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of MacArthur’s military strategies, including the idea that the Southwest Pacific needed 
more men and supplies.133  In short, Lyndon the cowboy sought to bring civilization to a 
place where there was little, evoking the feminized version of the frontier myth.  
However, simultaneously Johnson expressed the masculinized version of the myth, where 
“savages” were not entitled to natural rights belonging to “people,” but America could 
and should do its part to help to civilize these savages using whatever means necessary.134 
 Perhaps the most notable story from Johnson’s days at war was his participation 
in an air raid that earned him a Silver Star.  Johnson and two Army officers went to the 
22nd Bomb Group base, which was assigned the high risk mission of bombing the 
Japanese airbase at Lae in New Guinea.  A colonel took Johnson's original seat on one 
bomber, and it was shot down with no survivors.  Reports vary on what happened to the 
B-26 Marauder carrying Johnson.  Johnson recalled the B-26 was also attacked by 
Japanese fighters but survived, while others, including other members of the flight crew, 
claim it turned back because of generator trouble before reaching the objective and before 
encountering enemy aircraft, a perspective which is supported by official flight records.  
Other airplanes that continued to the target did come under fire near the target at about 
the same time that Johnson's plane was recorded as having landed back at the original 
airbase.135
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 Johnson was the only one of the participants of his air raid of similar rank and 
experience that received a medal for the mission.  He felt deeply self-conscious about 
receiving the medal.136  Some thought that Johnson might refuse the medal, as it was 
fairly straightforwardly undeserved by the typical standards of a Silver Star.137  If we 
know one thing that is deeply embedded in Johnson, however, it is his desire to play the 
hero.  The honor of the Silver Star and the credibility it could add to the growing cowboy 
mythology he sought to surround himself with was temptation too compelling to 
overcome.  So the Silver Star became part of the tale, a largely exaggerated and mostly 
untrue part of the tale, but an important part of the mythos nonetheless.138
 When Johnson returned to his House seat late in 1942, he recognized a shift in 
public opinion in Texas, a shift against President Roosevelt that could have potentially 
disastrous consequences to his own political future.  In Texas, this shift was most 
fundamentally a growing resentment from farmers directed at rationing and bureaucratic 
red tape, clear symbols of a Federal government grown increasingly large at the hands of 
Roosevelt and the New Deal.
 Johnson, concerned with his image, moved to align himself with this new, more 
conservative Texas opinion.  In a speech in December of 1942, Johnson criticized the 
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bureaucracy and Roosevelt at once.  The speech was both a direct appeal to the people of 
the 10th Congressional District of Texas and a pointed criticism of the Federal 
government as run by President Roosevelt.  Johnson condemned Roosevelt’s “over-
stuffed” government and identified several New Deal Programs worthy of criticism by 
name: the Public Works Administration (PWA), the Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA), and the Works Project Administration (WPA).  This was a specific and pointed 
critique of policies that just one year earlier received complete support and made up the 
entirety of Johnson’s platform against Pappy O’Daniel.
 ...What about over-staffed, over-stuffed government that worried
 along like a centipede—too good in the production of limbs and not
 good enough in the production of arms...What about the rationing
 that has gone irrational, about administrators who spend too much
 time laying down law to us and not enough time reading up on on
 the law? ...With our shoulders to the wheel of war against foreign
 enslavement, those old domestic pieces, the PWA, the FHA, and 
 WPA are now in the way...The social gain that we are very busy
 preserving at this moment is our status as free men in a free 
 nation.139
  
 Additionally, in this particular speech, Johnson spoke directly to the concerns of 
the people when he mentioned rationing gone irrational.  He criticized lawmakers and 
government officials so concerned with exercising and over-stepping their own authority 
as to become blind to the concerns of real people.  In this criticism, Johnson sent a clear 
message to his constituents, a message that he was not like these men.  His criticisms 
emphasized that he was one of the average people and shared their concerns.  This idea of 
establishing a connectivity and closeness— a sense of oneness with constituents and a 
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recognition of the appeal of populism— was a lesson that Johnson learned loud and clear 
in 1941 from Pappy O’Daniel.
 When delivered, the speech received considerable press and firmly reestablished 
Johnson in a favorable light in Texas politics.  It became something of a blueprint for 
what became common themes of Johnson’s public statements in 1943.140  At the start of 
the year, Johnson launched a campaign to use American manpower more efficiently in the 
war effort.  Johnson supported the same view that most Americans and Texans also 
supported—that labor unions were actively and selfishly hindering war production so that  
full potential was not reached.  At first, this idea does not seem to evoke any strain of 
cowboy mythology.  In fact, however, this idea is complimentary to the frontier myth of 
cooperation.  Here, Johnson displayed his belief in the cooperation of all Americans, 
labor unions and corporations included, to reach a common goal.  
 In the war efforts of 1943, Johnson, from his position in Congress, advocated for 
a more regimented, controlled, cooperative, and effective use of manpower.  Johnson, 
concerned by a Time magazine report that absenteeism at American factories was 
seriously hindering the country’s ability to produce war vehicles and ammunition, offered 
an amendment to a Navy Department Bill requiring shipyards to file quarterly reports on 
absenteeism statistics.  This amendment worked to ensure American workers felt duty to 
their place of employment and to America’s war efforts.  It placed emphasis on the idea 
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that we, as American citizens, should hold one another accountable for successes and 
failures alike.   
 Though Johnson’s absenteeism bill was shelved, it lead directly to his 
appointment to chair a Naval Affairs subcommittee whose aim was to investigate whether 
person in the Naval Department were “pursuing the war effort efficiently, expeditiously, 
and economically.”141  Here we see, again, Johnson’s desire to encourage community-
oriented success and to hold people accountable for communal failures.  
 In 1943 and 1944, Johnson walked a tightrope—supporting the Roosevelt 
administration’s war efforts and criticizing their New Deal and big government policies at 
once.  This move reflected Johnson’s recognition of the importance of the Texas 
conservatives in his district.  Johnson feared such divisions and did not like to be linked 
to either side.  Publicly, Johnson shunned his label as a liberal Democrat.  However, 
Johnson recognized the importance of countrywide cooperation in war efforts and 
remained loyal to welfare programs and economic regulations that helped those 
struggling in a post-war economy.  Also important to note are Johnson’s economic 
appeals to his constituents.  In January 1944, Johnson told the Texas Legislature:
 [Roosevelt is] for free enterprise.  I’m for local self-government.  [He’s]
 against centralizing power in Washington...but then [he] thought about
 free enterprise and about concentrating powers of government in 
 Washington and about local self-government.  And [he] reached this
 conclusion: [he wants] to substitute for free enterprise equal opportunity.
 Every man who has gone through a living Hell for you and for
 me, and comes out with scars on his body and his soul to show for
 it shall have an equal opportunity to get a job when this is over.142
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Johnson evoked the feminized frontier myth when he said he would “leave it to the local 
community to assume this responsibility,” but also said that if the community failed to act 
on this, that he would vote for legislation to make this possible.143  
 At the beginning his speech, Johnson lent support to “local self-government,” not 
necessarily an ideal one associates with liberalism, but certainly one we associate with 
the frontier.   Johnson offered approval towards groups of citizens who brought order to 
their own place, as opposed to Roosevelt’s large scheme of government, which forced its 
order on every town.  While not a complete and total rejection of Roosevelt’s policies, 
this showed Johnson’s strong desire to create a connection with the people in his district, 
an emphasis on populism he learned from O’Daniel.  Johnson emphasized the connection 
of all people to their place, and their responsibility for bringing government and order to 
that place.  He also worked to explain the importance of community recognition of 
heroism and patriotism.  
 Though Johnson did support many of the Roosevelt Administration’s wartime 
policies through 1944, it is important to understand why.144  Whereas in the past, 
Johnson’s support of Roosevelt’s policies was blind and aimed at the creation of a 
popular national identity, by 1944 a shift occurred.  Johnson felt a real sense of duty 
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towards the war effort, a sense of duty that harkened back to the ideas and myths about 
the frontier that surrounded him as he came to an age of political maturity.  
 Due to his belief in the power of community, Johnson was willing go against big 
Texas interests.  Johnson remained strongly opposed to wartime profiteering, even where 
oil was concerned.  Oil was king in Texas, but in a situation where Johnson stood to make 
a great deal of money, he was more concerned with preserving the interests and integrity 
of the nation as a whole.  In short, he was interested in working as a community for the 
benefit of that community.  A committee Johnson chaired in June of 1944 voted that all 
naval oil reserves should be in strict service to the American Fleet.  Again, in July 1944, 
Johnson voted against the interests of big oil and with the interests of the country at large, 
against a thirty-five cent increase in the price of crude oil.145  
 Political insiders in Texas feared this approach would not be advantageous to 
Johnson’s political prospects.  Tom Miller, Mayor of Austin in 1944, wanted Johnson to 
denounce oil rationing.  Instead, Johnson gave a speech denouncing people like Miller, 
the people in Texas who “...would withhold petroleum from our armed forces to use it at 
home.”146  Johnson rejected the special interests of Texas in favor of evoking strains of 
Texas mythology: the belief that by working together, a community could overcome even 
the most seeming insurmountable of opponents, in this case, a terrible war overseas. 
 Johnson felt comfortable about his political prospects in 1944 because the 
majority of party leaders in Texas still supported Roosevelt and his New Deal policies.  
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However, there was a growing movement of so-called “Regulars,” the conservative face 
of the Democratic party in Texas, who sought to take back control of the party.  Led by 
Commerce Secretary Jesse Jones, Senator Pappy O’Daniel, and hundreds of powerful 
oilmen, the Regulars appealed to the concerns of an average Texan: heavy governmental 
control and rationing of commodities essential to the success of Texas.   The Regulars 
wanted the state Democratic convention to select independent presidential electors for the 
Democratic column on the ballot who would decline to cast their electoral votes for 
Roosevelt in an effort to throw the election into the House of Representatives, where the 
South (and anti- New Deal sentiment) would have the numerical advantage.147  The plan 
failed, but Texas Regulars remained an organized group who advocated for “restoration 
of states’ rights and white supremacy.”148  The Regulars vehemently opposed labor 
unions and the New Deal.  Ultimately, after Roosevelt’s reelection, the liberal faction of 
the party prevailed.
 In 1945, Johnson’s political fortunes remained inextricably linked to the presence 
of President Franklin Roosevelt in the White House.  Though his platform was no longer 
one of blind support for Roosevelt’s platform and New Deal policies, Johnson was still 
seen, at least in Texas where it mattered most, as Roosevelt’s man.  At Roosevelt’s 
passing, in April of that year, Johnson felt a profound sense of grief.  But Roosevelt’s 
death influenced the development of Johnson’s policies and belief system.  Now fully 
free to move away from support of the President, Johnson focused on development his 
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own national identity.  Roosevelt’s passing, while a deep loss for all Americans, did not 
mean the end of his ideas and programs.  Johnson came of political age during the New 
Deal era and as such, became a bearer of the New Deal legacy.  Now, Johnson was free to 
mold these New Deal ideas about the power of helping and the power of community to 
his Texas and frontier ideals.  
 The period between Roosevelt’s death and Johnson’s next run at the Senate can be 
summed in a single word: uncertainty.  Johnson lost a man central to the crafting of his 
political identity.  He felt unsure of where to go next.  In this period of confusion, more 
than ever, Johnson fell back on images he had so deeply internalized his entire life, both 
consciously and unconsciously.  He fell back upon the frontier myths of cooperation and 
opportunity for all.  
 Johnson, in this post-war, post-Roosevelt era, voted using his frontier sensibilities.  
Johnson espoused government activism on behalf of the disadvantaged.  He voted to 
support members of his community that had sacrificed.  Johnson spoke and voted for bills 
aimed to help veterans of the war.  He supported President Truman’s bill for maximum 
employment of combat veterans and voted for legislation aimed to alleviate housing 
shortages due to the moratorium on new home building that occurred during the war.  He 
voted to continue price control laws to prevent the reoccurrence of the cycle of economic 
distress that happened post-World War  
 Johnson’s opponent in the 1946 Congressional election was Hardy Hollers, a 
Texas Regular and decorated Army veteran who placed heavy emphasis on his war 
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record.  Hollers also emphasized the issue of “honesty in government.”149  He alleged 
Johnson had people all over Texas—administrators, oilmen, even postmasters—in his 
pocket working for him.  Certainly some of Hollers’ accusations were justified, but they 
are just one piece of the puzzle.  More relevant to our analysis, however, is how Johnson 
reacted.  Johnson responded to Hollers’ accusations by fully transforming his political 
image, once and for all, into a cowboy, both in rhetoric and appearance.  Johnson showed 
that he was one of the common people, a Texas man just like the Texas men and women 
he represented.  
 Johnson’s campaign took him to each of the ten counties of his district.  Before he 
spoke, a four piece band, aptly named “Johnson’s Hill Billy Boys,” drove around town 
encouraging people to come hear Lyndon speak.150  Even before people heard him speak, 
this band all but guaranteed that they would have the cowboy myth at mind when 
thinking of Lyndon Johnson.  At some appearances, actor Gene Autry appeared, sang the 
song “I’m Back in the Saddle Again,” and urged voters to put Lyndon back in the saddle, 
where he belonged.151
 Johnson’s western, cowboy persona also shined through in his rhetoric.  Johnson 
used pure, tough-talking, American cowboy language and said he would fight anyone off 
who tried to take away freedom.  The image evoked is not necessarily an image of 
violence; rather, it is an image of being willing to stand for a place and to not allow 
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unlawful forces to rip that place from the hands of those who have ownership of that 
place.  
 That’s one of the many good things about us Americans.  There’s 
 not ever anybody going to take away our American privilege of 
 blowing off steam.  We’ll fight ‘em before we’d stand for that.  And 
 we’d whip ‘em.  Just like we always have.152
 Johnson didn’t just talk in rough and tumble generalities about place and the 
defense of place.  He also evoked images of a particular place: the Hill Country of 
Texas.   Johnson spoke of a special, western, and frontier-like place specifically.  He 
placed this geographic location at the top, and implied that this place was the very 
embodiment of what it meant to be American.  Johnson used pure and natural imagery.  
He implied that this part of Texas represented something special, and that the people that 
lived there had something important to do and say.  He linked the image of natural purity 
to something that was positive about this place.
 You know, it’s always a great thrill to come back to Johnson City 
 and the Hill Country.  There isn’t any question about it: up in the hills, 
 the sun shines brighter...the air is fresher...and the clouds are less troubled 
 that anywhere I know of.153
 Johnson also moved to criticize the Texas Regulars and make them appear to be 
the ones distanced from the people of the Tenth District.  Johnson diminished the power 
of the Texas Regulars by labeling them mere “clique.”  Johnson used a guilt trip 
evocative of the frontier, calling out these men for selling out to their community and 
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their neighbors.  In Johnson’s frontier mindset, these men represented the opposite of 
what it meant to be a strong leader.  These were the men that brought  ruin to 
communities because crucially, Johnson believed that the power of community spirit 
could bring people together to work to achieve a common goal.  Additionally, Johnson 
distanced himself from big oil and big industry.  In doing so, at once he made himself 
resemble a common man and attempted to rally others around him to work together, 
without the help of these traitorous men and businesses. 
  Now on the receiving end of that order from Big Oil, there is a 
  clique of men here in the Tenth District of Texas, men who have 
  sold out their community, their neighbors, and themselves.  I think 
  you will understand me when I speak of that clique of men that get 
  their orders from Big Oil, I think you will know what I mean when 
  I call them Little Grease.  Big oil...is too big for our district...it is 
  even too big for our state.154
 Johnson also used rhetoric to establish the Tenth District as a place of literal 
mythic significance.  Through his words, it seemed as if this district was the place of 
origin for the myth itself. 
  Men came to these 10 counties from nearly every nation on the 
  earth’s face.  Their grandfathers settles in Johnson City when the 
  Indians were still there.155
Johnson took listeners through his district’s history, back to the glory days when the 
frontier was still open and the men were still bravely facing the Indians and making 
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cowboys of themselves.  He established the district as a place of great importance, and 
invoked in those listening, a sense of history and a sense of place.
  They were the people who met in Noah Byer’s blacksmith shop 
  and wrote the Texas Declaration of Independence.  They wrote it 
  not because they believed men must have war, but because they 
  believed men must have peace.156
Listeners had a sense of a place with hundreds of years of history.  Additionally, and 
interestingly, Johnson rejected the frontier myth of violence.  He emphasized the 
peacefulness of these original settlers of Texas.  He emphasized the fact that they brought 
peace and not war to this place.  He appealed to the community-oriented strain of the 
frontier myth.
  And everywhere I have gone, I found the same kind of folks who 
  live in Central Texas.  Men who want no more than a job, the right 
  to worship as they please, the right to have schools for their children, 
  and churches and homes.157
Johnson concluded by reminding the people of his district of who they are, most 
fundamentally, as a population.  They are people who just want peace.  They are people 
who just want the very basic elements of civilization.  Johnson also said that these are the 
people he found everywhere.  This is important, for this is where Johnson attempted to 
make the move from Texas politics to national politics.  Johnson emphasized that the 
values of Texas, the fundamental values of the people of the Tenth District of Texas, were 
the fundamental values of the nation as a whole.  Johnson called values of his 
community-oriented strain of frontier mythology values of the nation as a whole.  In this 
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campaign, and through this rhetoric in particular, we see the first inklings of Johnson’s 
recognition of the national power held by in frontier mythology.  
 On July 27, 1946, Johnson won a decisive victory in his battle against Hollers.158  
However, just as Johnson recognized the power of the frontier mythology he used in his 
campaign, he also recognized that New Deal fervor was losing hold around the nation, 
and especially in Texas.  Truman’s low levels of popular support and the Republicans’ 
gains in the House and Senate in 1946 marked a sea change in American politics forced a 
shift in political ideology and campaign strategy that defined the remainder of Johnson’s 
political career.  
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Chapter Five:
1948 Battle on the Frontier & Beyond:
 Solidification of National Identity Through Dissemination of Myth
 Of Johnson’s time in the Senate, fellow Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois said, 
“first of all, physically, Lyndon Johnson is a very impressive person...when you heard 
him on the floor, you thought of him in terms of somebody who had real stature.”159  
Katharine Graham, personal friend of Johnson, said he “just got things done,” and added 
that it was “his Texas personality that did it.”160  Johnson is widely considered the most 
powerful Senate Majority Leader of all time, and his manipulation of cowboy and 
western mythology had much to do with how he came to this position.  In becoming 
Senator and Senate Majority Leader, Johnson became a man with a persona—a persona 
almost entirely reliant on the power of mythology.  In Johnson’s most heated campaign 
for the Senate, he called upon his farm-friendly voting record and more importantly upon 
his western persona, to win everything he had been working for his entire life—a seat in 
the Senate representing Texas.  
 Lyndon Johnson’s 1948 Democratic primary race against Coke Stevenson has 
been discussed in great detail.  Literally hundreds of books have been written about the 
electoral battle.  Here, however, we are specifically concerned with the cultivation of 
Johnson’s image that occurred between 1946 and 1948.  The majority of Johnson’s 
biographers acknowledge that a change in Johnson’s image occurred before he ran for the 
Vice-Presidency.161  Few, however, recognize the extent of the transformation that took 
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place in the 1948 election.  The differences we see between 1941 and 1948 offer the 
picture of a man deeply concerned with turning real features of his life into images 
consciously and strategically used to political advantage.  
 In 1941, Pappy O’Daniel left his Senate seat, and Johnson decided to make a 
run.162  Johnson’s decision to run in 1948 and not in 1942 was largely tied to new heavy 
financial support from friends and oilmen George and Herman Brown.163    His decision 
was decisive, and it had to be—to run for this seat Johnson was forced to give up his seat 
in the House of Representatives.  Here, Johnson demonstrated great confidence in his 
own political future and the power of myth.  
 Johnson’s opponent in the Democratic primary, Coke “Calculating Coke” 
Stevenson, remains a legend in Texas, even today.  Stevenson served as governor of 
Texas longer than any previous governor.  Stevenson was as authentically Texan as men 
come.  Born in a log cabin, he “campaigned almost entirely in the style of the Old 
West.”164  Stevenson was perhaps the best embodiment of the rugged, violent, 
individualistic strain of the frontier myth that Texas politics had ever seen.  His belief in 
limited government made him an icon for the conservative faction of the Democratic 
party in Texas.  
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 Ultimately, the battle in 1948 was about Texas at a crossroads in terms of political 
ideology. The election pitted against each other two men who could not have been more 
different in terms of both campaign style and their opinion of what the Democratic party 
should be in Texas.  Stevenson was simplistic in his approach to campaigning.  The tall 
man who frequently smoked a pipe felt comfortable one on one with people, and in fact, 
his nephew later recalled that “he wasn’t a backslapper.  He couldn’t work a crowd.”165  
He was old-school politics.  Stevenson rejected media and spectacle, preferring instead to 
drive county seat to county seat, delivering speeches to small groups of constituents.166  
Stevenson’s campaign represents the last traditional, pre-media campaign waged in a 
rapidly urbanizing Texas.  Stevenson was a true westerner and a real life rancher.  He had 
the experience and the myth in his hands.  Lyndon Johnson won in 1948 because he 
recognized the importance of use and dissemination of the myth on a large scale. The use 
of radio and of helicopters by the Johnson campaign to reach citizens all over the state of 
Texas was critical in the outcome of the election.  Lyndon Johnson, for perhaps the very 
first time in his political career, understood the full power of cowboy and western 
mythology used on a national scale.
 During the campaign, Johnson balanced on a tightrope.  He still had support from 
the liberal faction of the Texas Democratic party, however, the election with Stevenson 
was so heated that he knew he would also have to woo a significant portion of the Texas 
Regulars, the states rights advocates and conservative faction of the Democratic party in 
Texas, to win.  To do this, Johnson endorsed, wholeheartedly, the anti-labor Taft-Hartley 
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act, which was heavily supported by Texans.  Johnson used Stevenson’s refusal to 
endorse the act against him for much of the campaign.167  This, coupled with his voting 
record, largely in support of the New Deal, combined to create the image of a politician 
who refused precise definition as liberal or conservative Democrat.168  Stevenson, in stark 
contrast, ran on a platform that denounced “political promises, excessive taxation, and 
American communists.”169  
 In 1948, Johnson worked aggressively to make sure all Texans would know the 
important lesson that he learned in his 1941 loss to Pappy O’Daniel— that he was one of 
them: a rancher, a true cowboy, and, most importantly, someone who would work for 
them in the Senate.  Here, Johnson’s strong physical presence worked to great effect.  At 
one of his first campaign stops in Austin, Johnson got up to the platform, “sweaty in his 
well-tailored suit,” and made a big show of pulling off his expensive Stetson hat (perhaps 
the definitive piece of cowboy apparel), tossing it into the crowd, and shouting, “I throw 
my hat into the ring!”170  All of this posturing worked to enhance the content of Johnson’s 
speeches and reminded the people who came to see them that Johnson was truly a man of 
Texas. 
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Figure #3:
Here, Johnson arrived in Austin in May of 1948.  Whereas in previous years, Johnson spoke to crowds 
either bare-headed, or in a fedora, here, Johnson raised his Stetson, a literal symbol of the mythology he 
wished to convey to people, in the air, above his head where it would be obvious to all.  Johnson used 
signifiers of the myth to make his appeals more obviously evocative of cowboy and western myths.  
 
 In his very first campaign appearance in May of 1948, Johnson opened with 
rhetoric that made clear his approach to this campaign was very different than his 
approach to previous campaigns.  He began saying, “I intend to straddle no fences and 
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sling no mud.  Texas, and the world, have no time for that sort of thing today.”171  
Johnson approached the campaign as a cowboy and a western hero speaking from a place 
of power.  He used vivid imagery evocative of a western persona, a man willing to do 
dirty work, but not willing to fight dirty.  He continued with the statement, 
 I believe I share this philosophy with most Texans: We’ll do 
 anything within reason to get along with our fellow human beings.  
 But we won’t stand for being pushed around.172
Johnson established himself as a a tough guy who was used to farming and wouldn’t 
stand for someone telling him what to do, but also as a compromiser, someone willing to 
work with others to get the job one.  At once, Johnson evokeed a stereotypical cowboy 
persona— a gun-slinging man who won’t be pushed around— and the frontier myth of 
cooperation.  
 Johnson’s frontier-influenced strains of thought became particularly obvious when 
he spoke of attitudes Americans should hold towards war and communism.  In a speech 
delivered in Austin in May of 1948, Johnson identified “preparedness, peace, and 
progress” as three points on “the signpost to a better tomorrow.”173  Johnson spoke 
against the violent strain of frontier brutality in this particular appeal.  Johnson advocated 
instead for peace and cooperation.  He did not call citizens to battle.  Instead, he called 
them to be prepared to do their part.  Johnson’s desire for progress was reminiscent of the 
idea of people in a frontier town working together for civilization.  Johnson called Texans 
together for a common purpose.  
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 In addition to his use of rhetoric essential to his conception of the frontier myth, 
Johnson made sure that the media and public were aware of his support of issues 
considered western, those issues that helped bring civilization and order to places in 
which no civilization or order existed.  A June 1948 news release to all papers in Texas 
read:
 Johnson has long been a champion of rural electrification and has 
 established himself as one of the leading Congressional Authorities on 
 the subject.  Through Johnson’s efforts two of the country’s largest co-ops 
 were established in his district many months before other farm sections 
 began to participate in REA benefits.174
Here, Johnson presented himself as the man most able to do the job of bringing 
civilization to a place.  Johnson’s support of rural electrification literally brought light to 
towns all over Texas and the West at large.  With electrification came civilization, and 
Johnson wanted all of Texas to know that he was the western hero responsible for this 
civilization.  Johnson used the idea of rural electrification to ease supporters into the 
other facets of his 1948 platform: conservation, higher pay for teachers, improvement in 
healthcare quality, the guarantee of reasonable working hours, and a minimum wage.  
These community-focused initiatives formed the core of Johnson’s political identity.  
They were ideas born of the frontier, and their acceptance was dependent on belief in the 
idea that human beings should help one another to make a place better.  
 Also important to Johnson’s presentation of himself as hero of the West was a 
focus on the issues facing the farmers of Texas.  A transcript of a speech Johnson 
87
174 Lyndon B. Johnson, "News Release to all Papers by LBJ on REA, June 1948" Speech Files, 1948, 
Lyndon Baines Johnson Library & Museum, Speech Files, 1948.
delivered at least five times: in Austin, San Antonio, Houston, Beaumont, and Sherman, 
illustrates his focus on and ownership of issues that affected farmers.  
 I was born and raised on a farm.  I milked cows, dipped cattle, 
 picked cotton, weighed it up, and occasionally got to take cotton 
 to the gin...saw my own home place sold because cotton dropped.175
In announcing his support in this way, Johnson pointed to his personal experiences and 
emphasized that he was in a position to recognize and understand the problems of farmers 
and the significance of farm programs to their livelihoods.   
 Additionally, Johnson used rhetoric to create the image of Texas, and especially 
West Texas, as a place of mythic significance to the frontier.  His words helped establish a 
clear image of Texas as a place of beauty and importance to America.  In a speech 
delivered over radio to residents of Fort Worth in May of 1948, Johnson said:
 You know, if my hometown [Johnson City] were a little larger, we 
 might disrupt Fort Worth’s claim to being the place where the west begins.  
 We think the west begins a little east of Johnson City, where the purple hills 
 start rising into the plateau country.  Texans like to think of their state as a 
 world in itself; and we who are native to the Hill Country and the Edwards 
 Plateau are inclined to consider ourselves as a special kinds of Texan--
 the West Texan.  If all the stories about West Texans were laid end to end, 
 well it would make enough bragging to fill several volumes of the 
 Congressional Record.176
Johsnon knew that the West was a place important to voters.  He recognized the mythic 
significance of the place in which he was situated, so he presented Texas as the very 
starting point of the West.  He made Texas come alive with his vivid description of its 
rolling hills.   More importantly, he made the people of Texas, and the myths that 
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surrounded them, come alive.  He made their experiences seem powerful and he made 
voters believe that he himself was one of these special West Texans, the very embodiment 
of the myth.
 Whereas Stevenson only delivered pre-planned addresses to small groups of 
Texans, Johnson was in his element delivering impromptu speeches to large crowds all 
over the enormous state.  Johnson was a performer who could sense the mood of a crowd.  
Though his precise delivery varied, Johnson rarely strayed from a message that advocated 
government aid and foreign peace and belittled his opponent.177  Johnson promised that 
he could be the man to get the job done—to raise the living standards of all Texans— and 
he promised it in a way that made people feel at ease with him, like he truly was one of 
them.  A Johnson aide remarked, “He [spoke] their language—language they can 
understand.”178
 Stevenson’s response to Johnson’s employment of a western myth-centered 
strategy was uninspired.  Though Stevenson was a man who was authentically western, a 
man who was born and raised in West Texas and lived the ranching life of a West Texan, 
his record had none of the frontier sensibility and populist sentiment of Johnson’s.  
Stevenson voted to reduce funds for river authorities, cut back on teachers’ salaries, and 
abolished the Old Age Assistance Fund, a fund specifically created to support the elderly, 
blind, and dependent children.179  Nevertheless, Stevenson had popularity and name 
recognition in his corner.  The race was tight. 
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 On July 24, 1948, Texans voted for their Senator.  Unfortunately, this vote would 
not stand—no candidate won a majority of the vote, and a majority was necessary to 
secure a winner.    Stevenson captured forty percent of the vote.  Johnson trailed with 
thirty-four percent of the vote.  Johnson won his own district, the Tenth, and surrounding 
districts, the Eleventh, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth.180  A run-off election was scheduled for 
Sunday, August 29, 1948.
 If Johnson wanted to win the Democratic primary for this Senate seat, he needed 
to solidify his strategy, once and for all.  It would be the ultimate test of the broad appeal 
of western and cowboy mythology.  Johnson, though momentarily discouraged by his 
loss, told friends that he could win if he “worked hard enough.”181  Johnson intensified 
his campaigning, flying to multiple cities in the same day as Stevenson meandered the 
enormous state by train.  Stevenson was the outdated and old Texas politician.  Johnson 
represented new politics: a man savvy enough to take his life experience and the myth he 
internalized, and to disseminate it as widely and as quickly as possible.  
 In the build-up to the run-off election, Johnson called once again upon the lessons 
he learned in 1941 from Pappy O’Daniel.  In that election, O’Daniel filled constituents’ 
mailboxes with the O’Daniel News, a paper outlining his positions and strong connection 
to the people of the District.  In late July of 1948, Johnson launched the Johnson Journal, 
a four-page newsletter created at Johnson headquarters, and made to appear like an old-
time, genuine weekly paper.  This Johnson Journal was distributed to 340,000 mailboxes 
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in Texas with the headline “Communists Favor Coke.”  The inside of the paper contained 
appeals to the common man—the farmer.182
 In his final speeches before the run-off election, Johnson made sure to clearly 
state that he was the true candidate of West Texas and frontier tradition.  He emphasized 
his ties to the land and outlined the way that a real Texan would behave in electoral 
politics.  Certainly he attacked Stevenson on the basis of policy, but his more powerful 
and resonant appeals painted himself as a real man of the frontier and Stevenson as some 
sort of impostor.  Johnson recognized that these personal appeals based on a man’s 
character, relationship with the land, and relationship with the people of that land were 
more meaningful and powerful.  Greeting supporters at a speech in Houston, Johnson 
said,
 I like to get out and be with people.  Texans don’t want a 
 Senator who is afraid to leave air-conditioned hotel rooms 
 and speak to the people.183
Johnson purported to know what Texans wanted in a Senator.  He said they wanted a man 
who was not afraid to be with people.  They didn’t want a man who was “fussy,” and 
Johnson implied that “fussy” was precisely the type of man Coke Stevenson was.  
Johnson presented himself as the true Texas politician, a man not afraid to literally get his 
hands dirty interacting with the people of Texas.
 Johnson used rhetoric to encourage others to imagine him as the candidate of the 
farmer.  He tried to use his own experience living on a farm to appeal to the sensibilities 
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of the people to whom he spoke.  Speaking of himself at an address in Sherman, Johnson 
said,
 LBJ is the farmer’s friend.  I was born in the cedar brake country 
 near the little town of Johnson City and grew up in those hills.  
 At my father’s knee I was taught the wisdom in the words of one 
 of our great statesmen who said the great cities rest upon our broad 
 and fertile prairies.  Burn down your cities and leave our farms, and 
 your cities will spring up again...but destroy our farms and the grass 
 will grow in the streets of every city in this country.184
Johnson worked to place significance—literal and mythic—on the vital role of the farmer 
in Texas.  He established Texas and the myth of the frontier as important to everyone in 
America.  He implied that great cities everywhere in America, not just in Texas, rested on 
these prairies and on the backs of these farmers.  He said that while we could do without 
cities, we could not do without farmers, their farms, and the ideas that these important 
symbols of the myth represent. Later in the same speech, Johnson said Texans were 
“marching together in this victory march...the Big Texans, with big hearts, strong hands, 
and cool heads...The Texans who are doers...”185  Johnson equated being Texan with 
being a part of the myth.  He said Texans were tough folks who got things done.  He 
situated Texans in the frontier mythology as people who did important things, made 
towns, and most importantly, made America the power that it was.  He labeled himself as 
one of these people.
 Johnson, taking advantage of new media and the potential for wide dissemination 
of the myth that it allowed, used radio to present himself as cowboy.  In at least twenty 
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radio addresses that aired all over Texas— in Austin, in Houston, in San Antonio, in 
Sherman, in small rural communities that were only able to listen to the message because 
of Johnson’s support of rural electrification—the same message ran.  An announcer 
boomed it before Johnson even began speaking, and firmly established an image of 
Johnson as cowboy in the minds of listeners.
 This young man comes from the Texas Hill Country and has that 
 hill country look.  Six feet three inches tall and weighing more 
 than 200 pounds, LBJ has the kind of rugged frame you expect 
 to find on a Texan.  He’s sun-tanned and vigorous...
 [the crowds of TX] like his aggressive energy, they like his 
 common sense in dealing with our problems.186
If one didn’t know better, they might think they were listening to a reading of a pulp 
Western novel.  Johnson’s enormous size and strength were emphasized, and these 
characteristics were tied to the very fact that he was born in the Hill Country.  Labeled as 
vigorous and aggressive; Johnson would fight for people, but not blindly or using brute 
force, for the message also labeled him as a man with common sense.  
 In his final address before the definitive vote took place, Johnson presented 
himself as a Texas boy, a man situated in his place and in the frontier myth.  Johnson 
emphasized the fact that he was Texas born above all other attributes.  He emphasized the 
western issues in his voting record and made clear the importance of these issues not only 
in Texas, but also in the United States.  He made clear that his cowboy identity, so 
defined by the features of the frontier myth, was the direction in which America needed 
to look for its leaders.  
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 I come to you now at the end of this campaign simply as Lyndon 
 Johnson, a Texas boy, born and raised here in Texas...and I think all 
 of these things, building dams, helping farmers, are a part of the long 
 range plan which we should get busy on here in Texas and in the 
 United States of America.187
Johnson made populism—the idea that he was a simple Texas boy and just one of the 
common folk—a central theme at the end of his campaign.  It is telling that his last appeal 
was linked inextricably to and centered around the western persona he established earlier 
in the campaign and not to his voting record or attacks of Coke Stevenson.  Johnson 
recognized what would resonate with his supporters, and that was a man who, like them, 
had lived this frontier experience.  This appeal was powerful because it made frontier and 
West Texas concerns: concerns with the control of water, aid to farmers, bringing more 
civilization to a place the concerns of the nation as a whole.  Johnson, in his ownership of 
this myth, fashioned himself a national identity as he made the concerns of Texans 
problems of national significance.  
 Ultimately, the run-off was one of the closest elections in American history.  Pro-
Johnson election judges held back complete election returns from the Texas Election 
Bureau so that Stevenson forces would not know how many votes they needed to take the 
election.  The lead in vote count alternated between Johnson and Stevenson.  Both men 
went to extraordinary (and illegal) measures to ensure a win.188  A sort of mini tragedy 
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played out.  Ridiculous coincidences abounded, but ultimately, in late September, the 
Texas Democratic Convention certified (by a vote of 29-28, no less), that Johnson was 
the Democratic party from Texas’ official candidate for the Senatorial general election.189  
 Stevenson took the election to court, alleging voter fraud.190  County election 
officials, when forced to testify before a court, were vague and seemed to have trouble 
remembering the events of only a month before.  The conservative wing of the 
Democratic party in Texas helped Stevenson’s campaign collect evidence of fraud 
perpetrated by the Johnson campaign.  The campaign filed an injunction in attempt to 
keep Johnson’s name off the ballot of the November 3, 1948 general election.  Johnson 
and his supporters lobbied effectively to postpone election inquiries and prevent the 
injunction from coming to fruition.  Johnson easily defeated a weak Republican 
challenger.  Congressman Johnson finally became Senator Johnson.
 1948 was the single most significant year in Johnson’s political life.  In 1948, 
Johnson cultivated a national image based upon his lived experiences and a powerful 
myth.  Johnson grew into a politician who recognized and had conscious control over his 
own image.  Johnson recognized the power of the frontier myth, both in Texas and in the 
nation as a whole, and moved to base his entire image on his myth.  Through his support 
of policies that played into elements of this myth—policies like maintaining peace 
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internationally, bringing civilization to places where there was little, and working 
together as a community to support teachers, the elderly, and children, Johnson 
established himself as a true embodiment of the feminized strain of the frontier myth.  
Additionally, Johnson learned to use rhetoric that included signifiers of the west so that 
even before voters looked at his record, they would know that he was a true westerner.  In 
1948, Johnson proved once and for all that this innovative approach to politics, 
combining lived experience with the complex mythos associated with a place and a type 
of person, was exactly the direction in which national politics was headed.  Johnson 
himself was at the forefront of this American shift in focus to the west.  
 Johnson’s senatorial career presents us with the image of a man clearly gearing up 
for a national stage.  In early 1951, Johnson acquired another important signifier of the 
western myth he embodied: his very own ranch.  The ranch was not entirely political 
posturing, for it  previously belonged to his aunt, and for the rest of his life, even after he 
left the White House, Johnson poured money into the ranch and enjoyed spending time 
there.191  However, most importantly the ranch symbolized Johnson’s aspirations and 
became the place he used to hone his political image, the image that he clicked firmly 
into place in 1948.192 
 Johnson was a master of the Senate, but he did not become Majority Leader in 
1955 because of his emphasis on the cooperative strain of the frontier myth.  Instead, 
Johnson used manipulation of people in power to gain appointment to prestigious 
committees, and to establish himself as a leader.  Though the community-oriented spirit 
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of frontier myth was clearly very much still a part of the way Johnson voted, this voting 
record was over-shadowed by the aggressive, individualistic approach Johnson took to 
gaining and keeping power in the Senate. 
Figure #4:
Johnson’s “Treatment” 
 Perhaps one of Johnson’s most-remembered habits is what historians frequently 
refer to as “The Treatment.”  Johnson’s “treatment” was essentially a form of bullying, a 
sort of extreme posturing to get his way. Johnson’s arsenal included gentle prodding, 
begging, logical arguments, stern warnings, threats, and outright intimidation.193 Whereas 
the Johnson of electoral campaigns was a man who emphasized cooperation and working 
together to bring everyone to the same standards of living, the Johnson of the Senate and 
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the Presidency was a Johnson drunk with power, a man who would do anything to obtain 
power and push through legislation he supported.  Interestingly, the legislation Johnson 
supported did not abandon his community-focused strain of the frontier myth.  Johnson 
most frequently supported legislation designed to help people.  
 In 1960, John F. Kennedy, the Democratic nominee for President (only after a 
fierce battle with Lyndon Johnson), asked Johnson to join his ticket as Vice-President.  
Johnson accepted, and after helping to secure electoral victory against Richard Nixon by 
again calling upon his western heritage, Johnson served rather unremarkably as Vice-
President until President Kennedy’s assassination on November 22, 1963.  Johnson was 
sworn in as the 36th President of the United States that day.  
 In his six-year presidency Johnson at once embodied the characteristics of the 
community-oriented strain of the frontier myth and the violent, individualistic strain of 
the frontier myth.  Johnson did more than any other President to help the underprivileged 
in the United States.  His community-oriented politics culminated in a series of initiatives 
labeled The Great Society.  The Great Society was an enormous collection of welfare-
oriented legislation.  At one point, the bills that fit the Great Society label numbered over 
two-hundred.194  In 1964 and 1965, Johnson’s focused completely on the programs of the 
Great Society, speaking of the importance of “quality of life, beauty, community, and 
dignity.”195  He implored all American to strive together towards a utopian ideal.  Johnson 
remained idealistic.  He wanted to bring civilization to all Americans in the form of 
governmental assistance.  Perhaps this is most important to emphasize about the 
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community-oriented strain of the frontier myth that surfaced when Johnson was President
—the belief in the power of government to bring civilization and to enrich the lives of all 
citizens.
 We may be having a very different conversation about the implications for the use 
of western and cowboy mythology in modern American politics if Lyndon Johnson’s 
story had ended with the Great Society, which was literally an illustration of the 
community-oriented strain of the frontier myth that developed in him through his 
experiences in Texas.  Unfortunately, Johnson was also exposed to the darker side of the 
myth, and this masculinized strain surfaced in Johnson’s dealings with the Vietnam War.  
 The violent, individualistic strain of the frontier myth involves a division of 
borders.  The most basic border distinction is the Indian/White distinction, which roughly  
equates to a civilized/savage distinction.196 As previously discussed, fundamentally this 
myth is dependent on a critical assumption, an assumption that Johnson made in his 
dealings in Vietnam:
 the conquest of the wilderness and the subjugation or displacement 
 of the Native Americans who originally inhabited it have been the 
 means to our achievement of a national identity, a democratic 
 polity, an ever-expanding economy and a phenomenally dynamic 
 and 'progressive' civilization197
Johnson’s decisions in Vietnam stemmed from a deep-seated belief in the idea of 
American exceptionalism, and that exceptionalism was inextricably tied to the frontier.  
Here, Vietnam was a new frontier to be conquered and Johnson, because of his 
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internalized conception of myth, believed it was necessary for America to conquer this 
frontier to maintain a national identity.  Johnson took America past the point of no return 
in Vietnam.  Even when things took a turn for the worse, Johnson continued to commit 
America planes, weapons, and men to Vietnam.198
 In the minds of the majority of the American public, Johnson’s involvement in 
foreign affairs was repulsive and wrong.  They viewed America’s involvement in this 
foreign war as a sort of posturing for superiority.  America did not want to be defined by 
the myth that defined Johnson.  They did not want to live in a country that was seen by 
the world as an aggressor who would use violence to achieve national identity and to put 
its stamp of approval on foreign countries. Johnson, in acting the internalized role of 
cowboy, in being the bearer of this strain of the frontier myth, saw the public turn against 
him in large numbers.   In a tragic end to the triumph of the first real cowboy President, 
Johnson decided not to run for reelection in 1968.  
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Epilogue 
Where Have All the Cowboys Gone?: 
Do Cowboy Politics Have Staying Power in an Expanding American Political 
Landscape?
 In her 1998 masterpiece, singer-songwriter Paula Cole, from the depths of her 
romantic longing, asks a question surprisingly important to an analysis of the post-
Johnson American political landscape: where have all the cowboys gone?  While Cole is 
looking for “her John Wayne,” her “prairie song,” and her “happy ending,” we are left to 
wonder where all of cowboys like Lyndon Johnson have gone.  Certainly, we can look to 
the last thirty years of the Republican party and see the cowboy myth alive.  However, 
while the myth may be alive, Johnson’s preferred version of the myth, the feminized 
version emphasizing the spirit of community and a connection to the land, is certainly not 
well.
 With Johnson’s decision not to seek office in 1968 came the end of the 
community-oriented cowboy myth in American politics.  Since Johnson, no liberal 
Democrat has taken up the beacon of cowboy myth in a nationally-significant way.  The 
Republican party, however, is quite a different story.  Because of the candidates 
Republicans nominate, because of the western places they frequently come from, they 
often identify with the masculinized version of frontier myth that values individualism.  
Thus, in the past thirty years, conservatives have been responsible for a complete 
bastardization of what it means to be a cowboy.  
 The story begins with Johnson’s opponent in the 1964 Presidential Race, Barry 
Goldwater from Arizona.  Goldwater represented the Republicans’ first attempt at 
appropriation of the masculinized version of the frontier myth.  Goldwater presented his 
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campaign’s themes— “downsized government, reduced taxes and regulations, and 
expanded individual freedoms”— as a special brand of individualism, fundamentally tied 
to the masculinized frontier ethos.199
 Goldwater developed a ruggedly individualistic and masculine brand of 
conservative politics.  Though born to a life of wealth and privilege, Goldwater thought 
of and presented himself as a man of the West.  He liked to hunt and hike.  This, 
combined with his staunch anti-Communist stance, made Goldwater a politician that 
Americans responded and related to.  The modern, populist brand of conservatism that in 
later years, George W. Bush used to appeal to peoplewas born in Goldwater.  Goldwater 
rallied a generation of southern whites to the conservative cause.200
 Ronald Reagan was inspired by Goldwater’s rugged individualistic views about 
conservatism.  In the speech that launched his political career, Reagan discussed his 
support of Goldwater’s 1964 campaign and emphasized the value of this masculinized 
strain of frontier myth.  
 The Founding Fathers knew a government can't control the economy 
 without controlling people. And they knew when a government sets out 
 to do that, it must use force and coercion to achieve its purpose. So we have 
 come to a time for choosing.  You and I are told we must choose between 
 a left or right, but I suggest there is no such thing as a left or right. There is 
 only an up or down. Up to man's age-old dream – the maximum of individual 
 freedom consistent with order – or down to the ant heap of totalitarianism.201
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 In 1981, the ascension of Ronald Reagan to the Presidency brought cowboys back 
to the political mainstream.  Reagan was an actor who had literally played cowboys on 
film.   He was not born a cowboy; rather, Reagan came of political age in the era of 
Lyndon Johnson.  Reagan knew that the role of cowboy had mythic significance in the 
minds of Americans.  Because of this, Reagan learned to play the role of cowboy, albeit a 
very different kind of cowboy than Lyndon Johnson.  
 Reagan attempted to capitalize on the romantic notion that cowboys are straight-
shooting, honest and forthright men who tell the truth.  Reagan’s act was powerful, and 
he cultivated the image of cowboy even more successfully and completely than Lyndon 
Johnson before him.  The crucial difference, however, was that Reagan’s act was just that
— a great performance from a good and committed actor.  Reagan was exposed as a liar 
and a cheat when, in November 1986, it was disclosed that the Reagan administration had 
been bargaining with terrorists by selling arms to Iran.  Reagan went on television and 
vehemently denied that any such sale had occurred.  He retracted this statement a week 
later.  After the incident, popular support for Reagan plummeted.202  
 Additionally, Reagan represented a type of cowboy not interested in helping 
others.  Instead, his conception of cowboy was economically conservative.  Cowboy, as 
imagined by Reagan, and later, George W. Bush, was a man who stood up for himself, 
and only himself.  He rejected notions that he should help others.  He was individualistic 
and looked out only for himself.  This type of cowboy was manipulated to fit the aims of 
the Republican party.  
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 Most importantly, Reagan, in his years in office, escalated the Cold War.  Reagan 
was notable among post-World War II Presidents in that he believed the Soviet Union 
could be defeated through confrontation.  This desire for showdown is perhaps the very 
worst feature of the masculinized frontier myth.  Reagan acted as “heroic President:” a 
leader not acting out the majority will, but instead, acting “out of a higher and more 
perfect sense of the nation’s mission and necessity than any popular majority could 
possess.”203  Reagan acted using this myth as guidance, and perpetuated a nation where 
violence to justify victory was the norm.  
 After Ronald Reagan came George H.W. Bush, a wealthy Texas outsider who 
moved to Houston from Connecticut as an adult.  Regardless of this important difference, 
George H.W. Bush still attempted to present himself as a cowboy in his campaigns for 
Senate in 1964.  Bush failed, however, and the media called his bluff.  An article 
reflecting back on the campaign at its end, said Bush “never quite could convince the 
people he was really one of them.”204 
 As President, George H.W. Bush was frequently mocked for his disingenuous 
cowboy image.  Frequently, opposition bemoaned “poor George,” who just “couldn’t 
help being born with a silver spoon in his mouth.”205 It is important, however, to mention 
the masculinized strain of frontier myth Bush evoked in his foreign policy because of the 
impression these policies made on his son.  In August 1990, Iraq, led by Saddam Hussein, 
invaded its oil-rich neighbor to the south, Kuwait; Bush condemned the invasion and 
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rallied opposition to Iraq in the United States and among European, Asian, and Middle 
Eastern allies.  Allied forces launched an attack several months later in what became 
known as the Gulf War.  Bush made the decision to stop the offensive after a mere 100 
hours. Critics labeled this decision premature, as hundreds of Iraqi forces were able to 
escape; Bush responded by saying that he wanted to minimize US casualties.206  
However, this feeling of an unfulfilled quest haunted his son’s political career.
 George W. Bush, though raised in Texas, was molded by a significantly different 
set of factors than Lyndon Johnson and his own father.  Bush was born in Connecticut 
and raised in Houston, Texas.  The son of a wealthy family, Bush faced none of the same 
struggles of Lyndon Johnson.  Bush, however, recognized that he could use signifiers of 
the myth to appeal to Americans.  Less than a year before his bid for the presidency, Bush 
purchased a Crawford, Texas ranch, which he sold immediately upon leaving office.  His 
accent, his vacations on this Texas ranch, and his penchant for country metaphors 
contributed to his folksy American cowboy image, an image that, like Reagan’s, was 
created almost solely for mass media consumption.  
 In 2003, using the terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington D.C. as 
justification, George W. Bush declared a “War on Terrorism.”  Media response accused 
Bush of being a cowboy.  In a rare interview with Vice-President Dick Cheney, journalist 
Tim Russert asked:
 There is a perception, however, if you read any of the papers in Europe 
 and around the world, the constant description of the president as a cowboy, 
 that he wants to go it alone, that the president and you and the administration 
 that was perceived as extremely confident on foreign policy has been stumbling 
105
206 Lind, Made in Texas, 131.  
 and hasn’t reached out and nurtured alliances...207
This image of Bush as cowboy evokes the masculinized, ruggedly individualistic strain of 
frontier myth, and represented all that could go wrong in cowboy politics that subscribed 
to that particular ethos.  Cheney, for his part, emphasized his belief that these qualities in 
President Bush were positive.  Cheney responded to Russert’s questioning with an answer 
that avoided confrontation of the reality of the violence of the myth.
 So the notion that the president is a cowboy—I don’t know, is a Westerner, 
 I think that’s not necessarily a bad idea. I think the fact of the matter is he 
 cuts to the chase. He is very direct and I find that very refreshing208
Bush was depicted as rash.  His cowboy attitude was frequently described as something 
negative.  People abroad began to respond negatively to Americans and American culture 
because of what cowboy became in the hands of George W. Bush.  
 George W. Bush is a fake cowboy. From media accounts, you'd reckon 
 that the president was a buckaroo to the bones. He plays up the imag, 
 big-time, with $300 designer cowboy boots, a $1,000 cowboy hat, and 
 his 1,600-acre Prairie Chapel Ranch in Crawford, Texas. He guns his 
 rhetoric with frontier lingo, saying that he'll "ride herd" over ornery 
 Middle Eastern governments and "smoke out" enemies in wild mountain 
 passes. He branded Saddam Hussein's Iraq "an outlaw regime" and 
 took the vanquished dictator's pistol as a trophy. As for Osama bin Laden, 
 Bush declared, "I want justice. And there's an old poster out West, I recall, 
 that says, 'Wanted: Dead or Alive.'209
 Bush’s foreign policy adventure in the Iraq War is frequently compared to 
Johnson’s experience in Vietnam.  In both cases, men embodying the individualistic, 
stubborn strain of the frontier myth entered into foreign wars which served little purpose 
other than to spread the conception of American dominance and superiority to other 
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cultures.  This justification for the killing of thousands of innocents represents what can 
happen when this violent strain of frontier mythology is brought from widely 
disseminated fiction into actual foreign policy decisions.  It didn’t work for Johnson, and 
it failed for George W. Bush.
 Since Bush, there have been few contenders to take up the burden of the 
furtherance of cowboy and western mythology in America politics.  In the current 
Republican primary cycle, we have seen Rick Perry, Governor of Texas, attempt to carry 
on Bush’s legacy.  His approach, which favored showing up to events in a Stetson, 
dropping cowboy colloquialisms, and speaking in generalities about his political views, 
has already failed.  The remaining men in the field, economic-focused Mitt Romney and 
ultra-social conservative Rick Santorum have made little attempt to draw upon Perry’s 
approach.  
 So what does the Republican party’s failure at a continuance of the myth say 
about its future in American politics?  Western and cowboy mythology is incredibly 
gendered and race-specific.  Cowboys are white men.  Women and minorities have little 
place in the traditional cowboy-hero story, other than as supporting actors.  As our 
political realm expands to include women and people of color, the cowboy myth has 
proven inadequate.  
 More and more rapidly, the American political system, and Americans in general, 
are moving away from the enormous significance they placed on cowboy and western 
mythology.  In Johnson’s early political career, we see a community-oriented version of 
the cowboy myth that worked in politics.  Unfortunately, this success has been 
overshadowed by the role the more violent strain of the cowboy myth played in Vietnam.  
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Resuscitations of the myth have been unsuccessful because Republican candidates trying 
to take ownership of the myth have relied on this self-serving and violent strain of the 
myth.  
 For now, Johnson’s conception of cowboy and western mythology is all but dead 
and buried in the American political realm.  For a successful employment of this strategy, 
a politician must attempt to capitalize on this community-oriented strain—the idea that a 
cowboy is a most fundamentally a helper, not a man of great violence who seeks to 
venture the uncivilized areas of the world and stamp ‘America’ upon them.  
 There are, however, some small signs of life from the myth in Montana.  The 
state’s Governor, Brian Schweitzer, represents an example of a western Democrat 
concerned more with populism and issues of the West than he is with putting on a 
cowboy hat and getting involved in a violent foreign conflict.  In an editorial to the New 
York Times, Schweitzer responded to people who wanted to know how Montana 
managed to balance its budget.  Schweitzer spoke in simple terms that appealed to 
common people and evoked a particular frontier experience in his answer:
 How do we accomplish what most states and the federal government 
 cannot? I like to say we run government like a ranch. In ranching— 
 my old job— you either pinch pennies or go belly-up.  We do the 
 same in government. Perhaps Washington can try it.210
 There are signs that Schweitzer wants to manipulate the imagery of cowboys and 
the West as well.  In what was labeled “a dramatic way to make a point—Montana style,”  
Schweitzer vetoed a long list of far-right bills with a literal veto branding iron.211  
Schweitzer took offense at the extremist bills the far-right wanted to force on “his 
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people.”  Schweitzer, so far, seems to be taking Johnson’s populist, western-image 
focused approach to politics—and it’s working.  An approach like Schweitzer’s—that 
uses the rhetoric and image, but also has a legitimate populist appeal and concern—could 
rehabilitate Lyndon Johnson’s preferred version of the myth.
 In November of 2011, this Pennsylvania girl made the long trip to Texas.  When I 
arrived in Houston,  I was late for my connecting flight, and terribly lost in the airport 
(because everything really is bigger in Texas, even airports).  As I hustled past a row of 
men having their boots shined, I heard a booming voice, a real life cowboy.  “Y’all 
lookin’ for your flight?”  Did I judge him for using the phrase “y’all?”  Absolutely.  But 
that man became my hero when he followed me through the airport to help me find my 
gate.  My mother tried to tip him, but with a simple tip of the hat he was gone.  Cowboys 
like Lyndon still exist, and the community-oriented cowboy is not dead, though his 
narrative may currently be in American politics.  If we re-conceptualize the myth, if we 
take it back from the interpretation that spelled doom for Johnson, a new strain of the 
myth, a strain that includes all people and focuses on the important of all people, could 
emerge as powerful in American politics.  The myth is still very much alive in the 
American consciousness—and maybe if in twenty years we still can’t find it, we should 
just go looking in the Houston Airport.  
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presidency—the economy, the Middle East, and religious fundamentalism—and traces 
their roots back to Texas, a state that he argues offers clues to the future course of our 
country.  I use Lind’s work primarily to aid in my explanation of the political culture that 
created George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush’s use of the masculinized version of 
western myth.
Martin, Roscoe C.  The People's Party in Texas.  Austin: University of Texas: 1933.
 This work examines the roots and sources of strength of the Populist Party in 
Texas.  Lyndon Johnson’s ancestors were early supporters of populism, and as such, to 
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truly understand Johnson, we must understand what Texas populism was really about.  
This work contributes to this understanding.  
McKay, Seth Shepard.  W. Lee O’Daniel and Texas Politics, 1938-1942.  Lubbock: Texas 
 Technical Press: 1944.
 This work is a close analysis of W. Lee O’Daniel’s gubernatorial and senatorial 
campaigns for office.  It offers close profiles of O’Daniel’s challengers for office, 
including Lyndon Johnson.  This work is useful, in that it portrays O’Daniel as a folksy 
man, beloved by the people of Texas.  This is a strategy Johnson successfully adopted in 
his 1948 campaign against arch-rival Coke Stevenson.
Rothman, Hal K.  LBJ’s Texas White House: Our Heart’s Home.  College Station: Texas 
 A&M  University Press: 2001.
 This book, written by Hal K. Rothman, American West Historian, is essentially a 
biography of a ranch.  His account of Johnson’s ranch and the things that happened at 
Johnson’s ranch is helpful in establishing the enormous symbolic value that the ranch 
held for Johnson and in the minds of Americans.  Rothman also touches on this 
symbolism, exploring Western mythology and how it relates to the Johnson ranch.  
Schwarz, Jordan A.  The New Dealers: Power Politics in the Age of Roosevelt.  
 New York: Vintage: 1994.
 Historian Jordan Schwarz’s work represents a radical, and critical, assessment of 
the programs of the New Deal.  Schwarz argues that New Dealers created new markets in 
underdeveloped regions of the U.S., particularly the South and West, by weakening the 
Northeast's control of capital.  Schwarz credits FDR's New Deal with expanding state   
capitalism.He focuses on several New Dealers individually, including a twoTexans 
important to my work, Johnson’s mentor Sam Rayburn and Johnson himself, who 
championed regional development.  This work is illuminating and helps create the 
context in which Johnson developed politically, a context that is necessary in explaining 
how Johnson, and the United States, developed in a post-New Deal era, an era in which 
Western concerns became the concerns of the nation.  
Slotkin, Richard.  Gunfighter Nation: The Myth of the Frontier in Twentieth-Century 
 America.  Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press: 1998.
 Historian Richard Slotkin’s seminal work, the third-volume in a larger collection, 
traces the pervasiveness of frontier mythology in American consciousness from 1890 to 
the present.  Through Slotkin’s work, we see the profound importance of western and 
frontier mythology in all areas of American life.  Lyndon Johnson took advantage of the 
importance of frontier mythology, and built his image around it.  Though Slotkin’s work 
is perhaps hampered by his obsession with frontier mythology’s relationship to the 
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Vietnam War, this work is still perhaps the most important in establishing context and 
importance of western and frontier mythology in American life.  
Smith, Henry Nash.  Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and Myth.  Cambridge: 
 Harvard University Press: 1978.
 In this work, historian Henry Nash Smith argues that the spell the West has 
always held over American people had its most profound impact on American literature 
and thought during the nineteenth century. Smith shows the influence of the nineteenth-
century West in special relation to social, economic, cultural, and political forces.  He 
traces the myths and symbols of the American West.  This is  another work useful in 
establishing factors and forces in American life that are Western.  The images Johnson 
used in political campaigns were images important and well-established in all facets of 
American life, and were easily recognized by all Americans.  
The Texas State Historical Association, “A Digital Gateway to Texas History,” 
 http://www.tshaonline.org/, accessed March 07, 2013.
 The Texas State Historical Association's online resource was a veritable 
encyclopedia of information on everything Texas.  I used the website frequently, as a tool 
to add small details to my descriptions of people, places and events.  
Thompson, Patricia Louise Parker.  “ Y’all Come to the Speakin’: Lyndon Johnson and 
 his Speech Writers”  Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1997. 
 This unpublished dissertation examines Lyndon Johnson’s relationship with his 
speechwriters, from his congressional career to his days running for President.  The work 
offers a close analysis of speech drafts, edits Johnson made to these drafts, and transcripts 
of the speeches as they were actually delivered.  This work shows Johnson’s conscious 
manipulation of words to include more colloquialisms and elements of western and 
cowboy mythology.  It also displays how Johnson changed his rhetoric based on who he 
was speaking to and where he was speaking.  It is a truly illumination account of how 
Johnson used his time talking to the public to his advantage.  
Tompkins, Jane.  West of Everything: The Inner Life of Westerns.  Cary, NC: Oxford 
 University Press: 1993.  
 In this work, Jane Tompkins examines elements of the popular Western as they 
appear both in print and on film.  She probes the main elements of the Western: its 
preoccupation with death, its barren landscapes, faithful horses, and tough men,  
revealing the view of reality and code of behavior these features contain. She considers 
the Western hero's fear of women and language and his desire to both dominate and 
merge with environment.  Tompkins argues that from elements of the western, American 
men have learned to behave.  For better or for worse, these elements were essential in 
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shaping Lyndon Johnson.  Though Tompkins’ work pertains primarily to works of fiction, 
it also has implications for real human beings, Lyndon Johnson included.  His behavior in 
campaigning for elected office, and acting as political leader, illustrate elements of this 
cowboy code of ethics Tompkins calls to our attention.  
Willis, Gary.  John Wayne’s America.  New York: Literary Research, Inc: 1997.  
 
 Gary Willis’ John Wayne’s America is the biography of an actor who influenced 
America and American political culture to a degree that is, of yet, unmatched.  Willis 
describes the ways in which John Wayne came to embody American values and western 
myth.  I use this work primarily to establish John Wayne as a major source of signifiers of 
western myth.  Wayne’s physical appearance—his Stetson, cowboy boots, and stance—
came to embody American ideas of masculinity and the West.
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